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RELATIONAL MARKETS IN INTIMATE GOODS
Michele Goodwin*
This symposium is dedicated to examining the rich body of work of an enormously
talented scholar and scribe of the law, Richard Epstein. With a bibliography so
extensive, nearly a dozen scholars were sought to meet this inspiring challenge. As an
honored participant, it was my pleasure to ruminate on the overlap between my work and
that of Richard's on the body market. Of course, defining Richard Epstein's work is at
times the work of defending Epstein's work. Epstein writes with intensity and integrity,
unpacking that which brings about a bit of controversy-not as a trope for inciting
critique-but rather speaking honestly to issues otherwise ignored, or treated with the
most insincere forms of social correctness. Some might offer that he writes with an aura
of defiance, often resistant to embracing conventional wisdom simply because others
choose to follow that path, even within law and economics, a field that he has come to
shape, define, dominate, and defend.
This project places at its intersection my shared interests with Richard Epstein, in
part as a tribute to his distinguished catalogue of scholarship, and also because we share
an urgent vision about organ transplant policy in the United States. The urgency for a
more responsive transplant policy was publicly revealed in stark and chilling ways
during the summer of 2009 through the federal indictment of Levy-Izhak Rosenbaum, a
New Jersey rabbi who brokered organs on the black market.1  In many ways,
Rosenbaum's lucrative underground business of coordinating kidney transplants for a
steep fee flourished as a by-product of a problematic federal system that regards creative
organ procurement regimes through a punitive lens, rather than as "patient-proactive.
2
Over the years, this federal system prohibited organ swaps, frowned on directed
donations from strangers, 3 discouraged solicited donations, 4 dampened enthusiasm for
* Everett Fraser Professor of Law and Professor of Medicine and Public Health, University of Minnesota.
I am grateful to Richard Epstein for inviting me to participate in this special symposium. He is a terrific
scholar, but more importantly my friend. I would also like to thank the editors at the Tulsa Law Review.
I. See Talk of the Nation, "The International Organ Trafficking Market" (NPR July 30, 2009) (radio
broad.) (transcr. available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld = 1 11379908).
2. See e.g. Michele Goodwin, The Body Market: Race Politics & Private Ordering, 49 Ariz. L. Rev. 599,
627 (2007).
3. Though direct donations do not involve monetary transfer, given the international black market in organ
trade, there is a shadow market price (value) inherent in the exchange itself. See generally Charles T.
Carlstrom & Christy D. Rollow, The Rationing of Transplantable Organs: A Troubled Lineup, 17 The Cato
Journal 163, 172-73 (Fall/Winter 1997) (available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/joumal/cj l7n2-3.htnl); but see
Legality of Alternative Organ Donation Practices Under 42 U.S.C. § 274e, 31 Off. Leg. Counsel § 1 (2007)
(available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2007/organtransplant.pdf).
4. Arthur Caplan argues that solicited donations undercut the "ability of the system to get organs to those
most in need." Arthur L. Caplan, James J. McCartney & Dominic A. Sisti, Health, Disease, and Illness:
1
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funeral benefits from states, and treated with wary skepticism online organ matching
systems like MatchingDonors.com. 5 More disturbingly, the federal system prohibits any
organ exchanges that involve "valuable consideration," 6 which could include something
as innocuous as a cup of coffee or slice of bread.7 Violation of NOTA can result in a
felony conviction, with a five year prison term and fifty thousand dollar fine. 8 Some
doctors and hospitals refuse to service these alternative transplants, arguing that even if
the law is not enforced as to these types of donations, they violate the spirit of the
transplant policy and harm the interests of waitlist patients. 9 Ultimately this restrictive
system results in thousands of deaths each year.
This article moves beyond challenging the choir and debating the alienability of
human biologics, to discuss how relationships create private markets and might serve as
a platform in the domain of biological supply. This may be where Epstein and I part
company, though, I think, only by a matter of degrees. Specifically, this article considers
whether intimacy has a role in markets and if so, how intimacy functions with regard to
supply and demand.
My analytical hunch, that organ platforms allowing individuals to maximize
relational value-without legal penalty--could enhance organ supply, derives in part
from other human biological domains, and a growing body of empirical evidence that
illustrates that choice and relationships matter in human biological exchange. 10 Organ
transplant waitlists reveal a grim national story of pain, delay, and death. Men and
women suffering from infertility, as well as gay couples, lament their reproductive
predicaments and attempt to resolve this plight usually through the explicit use of
markets.1 1  Women who, for a complicated and often compelling list of reasons,
including what some doctors refer to as a "hostile womb," cannot carry a fetus to term,
lease the wombs of other women. 12  Infertile couples less concerned about genetic
matching utilize a sophisticated network of agencies-that for often exorbitant fees-
connect would-be parents with the child they desire. 
13
In part, the demand for most human biologics can be attributed to advancements in
biotechnology. Sophisticated laboratory techniques allow for the creation of embryos
Concepts in Medicine (Georgetown U. Press 2004); but see Richard A. Epstein, The Human and Economic
Dimensions ofAltruism: The Case of Organ Transplantation, 37 J. Leg. Stud. 459, 489 (2008).
5. See e.g. Patrick D. Carlson, The 2004 Organ Donation Recovery and Improvement Act: How Congress
Missed an Opportunity to Say "Yes" to Financial Incentives for Organ Donation, 23 J. Contemp. Health L. &
Policy 136, 146 (2006); Epstein, supra n. 4, at 490-91.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2001).
7. Id.
8. Id. at § 274e(b).
9. See Virginia Postrel, "Unfair" Kidney Donations, Forbes Mag. 124, 124 (June 5, 2006) (quoting
Douglas Hanto, stating "we won't do them," referencing transplants that involved solicitations and negotiations
outside of the UNOS waitlist process); United Press Intl., Organ Donor Club Grows, Has Critics,
http://www.physorg.comnews69600196.html (June 14,2006) ("Dr. Douglas Hanto of Harvard Medical School
said organs should go to the person who needs it the most, not to people because they are members of a club.").
10. See e.g. Sharon R. Kaufman, Ann J. Russ & Janet K. Shim, Aged Bodies and Kinship Matters: The
Ethical Field of Kidney Transplant, 33 Am. Ethnologist 81, 82 (Feb. 2006).
11. See e.g. Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849, 1928 (1987).
12. See e.g. Ugly Betty, "Zero Worship" (ABC Jan. 10, 2008) (TV series) (in this episode, Wilhelmina
cannot carry a child because she has a hostile womb and thus seeks a surrogate).
13. See Cheryl Miller, Babies for Sale, 13 New Atlantis: A J. of Tech. & Socy. 94, 95 (2006).
[Vol. 44:803
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RELATIONAL MARKETS IN INTIMATE GOODS
outside of the womb, laparoscopic organ retrieval and transplant, and the utilization of
human tissues typically discarded. 14  But there is an equilibrium problem; usually
demand outpaces supply in the natural sphere and individuals must turn to alternative
means to acquire the biologics they desire. This disparity between supply and demand
persists across a broad spectrum of demand for biologics that can only be derived from
humans, and usually, most preferably from living persons-though exceptions exist.
The supply and demand regimes for ova, organs, and children, are treated differently
legislatively and in public thought.
The dual statuses of intimacy are employed here-both as a metaphor for
relationships and affinity linkages (based on race, gender, or even religion), and also as
the term relates to the exclusively yours: biological goods, such as kidneys, ova, sperm,
and babies. Does intimacy constitute a market on its own? The primary thrust of this
project considers whether the law has the capacity to tolerate "markets" or
"cooperatives" based on affection, affinities, or intimate relationships for human
biological supplies given that they tend to discriminate. In part, the law currently acts
blind to some preference grouping even when there may be a negative social impact,
while policing other "members only" services. 15 Sophisticated baby markets, where
complex negotiating and matching of preferences usually coincides with other forms of
matching according to race, gender, and ethnicity, provide ample evidence supporting
this point. On the other hand, policies that limit access to or exclude members of
particular groups by race, gender, and religion are typically unconstitutional. 
16
Thus, this project analyzes market demand for intimate goods. By intimate, this
project is not speaking explicitly, implicitly, or even indirectly of sex. Rather, the focus
here is on children, organs, and reproductive materials. By relational, I speak to another
form of intimacy-that is to say, the paper speaks to what role and authority should be
given to familial and affinity bonds in markets. Specifically, the article considers
whether markets in intimate goods are distinguishable from other markets for the
purposes of tolerating discrimination.
Part I paints a crisper image of the contemporary demand and supply imbalance in
the biological sphere. This section analyzes why we might desire special markets in
certain intimate goods. The term markets is used with artistic license here, as the thrust
of this section is not exclusively about financial payments for goods in demand, but
rather it expands the meaning to include an understanding that relationships or affinities
like race, gender, or religion at times metaphorically serve as a type of "incentive" by
inspiring members of those groups to engage in projects, programs, and activities they
otherwise might avoid or decline. Part II briefly addresses terminology, specifically
considering what relational means in the contexts employed in this paper. Part III
examines the constraints in markets and considers how we might maximize their
efficiency. Here I piggy-back just a bit on Richard McAdams scholarship on
discrimination, which is highlighted in this issue. In this project, I consider why we
14. See Laura S. Langley & Joseph W. Blackston, Sperm, Egg, and a Petri Dish: Unveiling the Underlying
Property Issues Surrounding Cryopreserved Embryos, 27 J. Leg. Med. 167, 173 (2006).
15. Carlstrom, supra n. 3, at 169-70.
16. See U.S. Const. amend. 1; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
2009]
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might want to tolerate a bit of discrimination in some markets. Part IV concludes this
paper.
I. THE DEMAND FOR INTIMATE GOODS
This article starts in a space where Epstein and I share common interests, health
law, and specifically, domestic organ transplant policy. We share first principles in this
domain, namely that transplant policy should maximize saving lives-particularly as
technology affords doctors the capacity to do so with minimal risks and resources stand
readily available. 17  We agree that an optimally functioning transplant system will
protect individual autonomy, avoid coercion, and guard against fraud.18 In essence, a
transplant regime that maximizes saving lives, but undermines liberty and autonomy in
the process, would not fit either of our goals.
Our bottom lines are much the same, that the current altruistically-based U.S.
transplant regime is imperfect, fraught by delays, patients fleeing the waiting lists for
black markets, and avoidable deaths. 19 While a growing chorus of scholars, pundits,
doctors, and patients with this sentiment agree, their harmonizing support for transplant
regime alternatives is at times muffled, if not hushed entirely by a vigorous choir of
those who believe in the primacy of altruism, and that financial considerations should
never overlap with biological demand and supply regimes.
2 0
Part I considers the demand for human biologics, specifically organs. By its
approach, this section urges a subtle, conceptual refraining of materials derived from the
body; a more transparent view of the human body as a legal object of exchange through
borrowing, marketing, sharing, and other forms of exploitation. This section addresses
the empirics of patient demand for human biologics. To be clear, private individuals are
not the only agents interested in exchange of human biologics. Doctors, researchers,
pharmaceutical companies, cosmetic firms, bum clinics, tissue banks, and others also
make demands for human biologics. However, that discussion is beyond the scope of
this paper, but can be found in other works.
2 1
As of July 2009, over 102,000 people have formally committed themselves to the
U.S. transplant waiting process. 22 That number does not reveal the totality of individuals
dying--quite literally-for an organ. 23 U.S. transplant policy requires some rationing.
17. See Michele Goodwin, Altruism's Limits: Law, Capacity, and Organ Commodification, 56 Rutgers L.
Rev. 305, 324 (2004); Epstein, supra n. 4, at 464-65.
18. See Goodwin, supra n. 17, at 308, 312; Epstein, supra n. 4, at 486.
19. See id. at 462-63; Goodwin, supra n. 17, at 307, 308. See generally Michele Goodwin, Black Markets:
The Supply and Demand of Body Parts (Cambridge U. Press 2006) [hereinafter Goodwin, Black Markets].
20. See e.g. Michele Goodwin, Confronting the Limits of Altruism: A Response to Jake Linford, 2 St. Louis
U. J. Health L. & Policy 327 (2009).
21. See Michele Goodwin, Formalism and the Legal Status of Body Parts, 2006 U. Chi. Leg. Forum 317,
320. Harriet Washington's elegant work exposes the many ways in which prisoners, the poor, and other
marginalized groups have been pursued as unwitting subjects of human research. Harriet Washington, Medical
Apartheid: The Dark History of Medical Experimentation on Black Americans from Colonial Times to the
Present (Random House 2006). See also Moore v. Regents of U of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120 (1990); Brotherton v.
Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991).
22. See United Network for Organ Sharing, http://unos.org (last accessed July 2009).
23. See Virginia Postrel, With Functioning Kidneys for All, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200907u/
kidney-donation (July 9, 2009).
[Vol. 44:803
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For example, removing very sick patients from waitlists is a form of rationing. 24 The
U.S. also removes from the waitlists those deemed too elderly to warrant an organ.
25
These are the policies born out of a deadly form of rationing that responds directly to
grave organ shortages. Desperate choices are made in order to preserve the system of
altruistic organ procurement, which forms the ideological and legal approach to organ
sharing in the U.S.
26
Despite the significant number of individuals on the waitlists, very few will be
granted the opportunity to receive the precious renewal on life. As of July 13, 2009, the
United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), the agency that oversees federal transplant
policy and programs, reported that barely 4,700 persons had volunteered to be donors in
the first half of 2009.27 That figure includes living and cadaveric donors. As a result,
surgeons were unable to transplant even 10% of the waitlist. To gain a fuller
understanding of what some commentators refer to as a "crisis," a brief historical
overview is necessary.
Over 80,000 Americans wait on U.S. transplant lists for a kidney.28 Thousands of
sick patients are added to this list each year. 29 Roughly seven thousand will die this
year, thousands more will be expelled from the list for reasons explained above, and
30 31hundreds more will be added. 0 In less than ten years, the wait list has nearly doubled. 1
In 2000, 47,280 people were waiting for kidneys. 32 Less than ten years later, not only
have the number of persons admitted to the waitlist nearly doubled, but the average
waiting time is practically unbearable. According to Dr. Benjamin Hippen, a renowned
nephrologist and member of the UNOS board of directors, by 2010, kidney patients can
expect to wait ten years for certain organs. 33 Because the waitlist identifies only 100,000
persons waiting for organs, most Americans might be surprised to learn that more than a
half million could benefit from or seriously need an organ transplant. 34
According to the National Kidney Foundation (NKF), over 485,000 Americans
suffer from end-stage renal disease.3 5 Some patients learn too late about their illness,
24. See Ronald Munson, Raising the Dead: Organ Transplants, Ethics and Society 201 (Oxford U. Press
2002).
25. Id.
26. See e.g. Goodwin, supra n. 17, at 311.
27. See United Network for Organ Sharing, http://unos.org (last accessed July 13, 2009) [hereinafter
UNOS] (information on waiting list candidates, transplants, and donors can be found on the introductory page).
28. See U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Organ Procurement and Transplant Network,
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ (last updated Nov 1, 2009) [hereinafter OPTN].
29. Id.
30. See U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 2005 OPTN/SRTR Annual Report,
http://www.ustransplant.org/annual Reports/archives/2005/106_dh.pdf (May 2, 2005) [hereinafter 2005
Annual Report]; Michele Goodwin, Organ Taboos, Forbes Mag. 32,32 (Oct. 15, 2007).
31. D.J. Cohen et al., Kidney and Pancreas Transplantation in the United States, 1995-2004, 6 Am. J.
Transplantation 1153 (2006).
32. 2005 Annual Report, supra n. 30 (This part of the report can be found at http://www.ustransplant.org/
annual reports/archives/2005/103_dh.pdf).
33. Benjamin Hippen, The Case for Kidney Markets, 14 The New Atlantis: A J. of Tech. & Socy. 47, 54
(Fall 2006).
34. UNOS, supra n. 27.
35. National Kidney Foundation, End Stage Renal Disease in the United States, http://www.kidney.orgl
news/ newsroom/fsnew/esrdinus.cfm (last updated Mar. 2008).
2009)
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when they are too sick to be admitted to the waitlist.36  Others, because of sketchy
medical history, prior drug use, or other factors may be restricted from the list-not
through a national evaluation system, but by the very subjective process left to often
well-meaning doctors faced with the enormous burden to refer who gets on or is
excluded from the waitlists. 37 The less fortunate-those patients who are less informed
about the complex matrix involved with obtaining an organ transplant-are relegated to
dialysis clinics. For them, more than 341,000 patients, transplantation is not an option.
38
The death toll from end-stage renal disease also places the urgency for kidney
exchanges in context. Nearly 87,000 patients die each year from end-stage renal
disease. 39 Overwhelmingly, these are individuals who were shaved from the waitlist or
never made it onto the list. A more transparent list-that leveraged all sick patients into
the process-would demonstrate in undeniably stark terms the critical nature of the
demand for kidneys. The list expands exponentially each year. Researchers and
transplant surgeons project that in just a few years the number of patients coping with
end-stage renal disease will reach well over 700,000.40
In a recent publication, Frances Kessling provides an elegant illustration of what
that lengthy wait time means for Americans in need of kidneys. 4 1 In part, Kessling
reveals her own personal struggle to find a donor, but as she asserts, her extensive
network of friends and other social and political connections made her plight more
bearable, and finding a donor more expedient than for most Americans-or the 90% of
waitlist patients (this year) who have yet to find a donor. Kessling's doctors made her
case clear: dialysis, transplant, or death.4 2 To those more informed about dialysis, the
options quickly narrow to two: transplant or death.
Dialysis does not resolve end stage renal disease (ESRD), kidney failure, diabetes,
high blood pressure, hypertension, or the other conditions that lead to compromised and
ineluctable kidneys. Rather, dialysis, which removes excess waste and fluids from the
blood, is a short, urgent intervention on a certain road to death without an organ
transplant. 43 According to a study conducted by the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), "[i]n the long term, dialysis is associated with a lower quality of life and higher
mortality rates than kidney transplants and is considered a less desirable treatment
36. Goodwin, supra n. 2, at 611 (interviewing Jack Lynch, an executive with the Illinois Gift of Hope
organ procurement organization, who warns that too often patients misread the signs of end-stage renal failure,
believing their condition to be urinary or related to a sexual condition or infection).
37. Laurie Abraham, Momma Might Be Better Off Dead (U. Chi. Press 1993). Abraham spends two years
investigating health care coverage in inner-city Chicago, following a family's stoic adventure through the U.S.
health care maze. A significant and quite compelling aspect of her book addresses organ transplantation and
the sometimes unscrupulous ways in which doctors are forced to ration kidneys.
38. Susan Bohan, Despite Advantages, Home Dialysis Slow to Grow, http://www.satellitehealth.com/
_docs/insideBay_308.pdf (Mar. 3, 2008).
39. Frances Kessling, Whaddaya Have To Do Around Here To Get A Kidney, http://www.salon.com/
mwt/feature/2009/03/27/mykidney/index.html (Mar. 27, 2009).
40. J. Stewart Cameron and Juan F. Macias-Nzllez, Chronic Renal Failure in the Elderly, in Oxford
Textbook of Clinical Nephrology vol. 2, 2166 (Alex M. Davidson et al. eds., Oxford U. Press 2005).
41. Kessling, supra n. 39.
42. Id.
43. National Kidney Foundation, Dialysis, http://www.kidney.org/atoz/content/dialysisinfo.cfin (last
updated Aug. 18, 2008).
[Vol. 44:803
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option. ' '44 Dialysis is an intervention with a limited shelf-life; the average lifespan for a
person over forty receiving dialysis is 5-8 years. 45 The length of survival reduces by
half at age sixty.
46
Kessling ponders whether publicity about improvements in dialysis misinforms the
public about the strenuous process, which takes an enormous toll not only on the
individual patient, but also families, local communities and the national economy.
47
According to Kessling, "we imagine people go sit in a nice chair for four hours three
times a week, read a book and then go about their daily lives." 48  In fact, dialysis
requires being tethered to machines several times per week for several hours each time.
4 9
Patients on dialysis usually cannot work or do so in a very limited capacity; events and
functions typical to a healthy life, such as travel, attending family events, and
participating in community organizations are placed on indefinite hold. 50 Patients are
generally so weak after treatment that they require immediate rest to recover. 5 1  A
pragmatic evaluation of a half million individuals on dialysis, and the tens of thousands
on transplant waitlists, begins to illustrate the unmitigated challenge in resolving organ
demand.
The national organ demand conundrum also has economic and racial impacts,
which are explained briefly here. Over one third of kidney patients are African
American. 52 They experience the highest death rate, wait longer than all other groups,
and seem to be in greatest risk among all ethnic groups. 53 Despite comprising nearly
35% of the kidney waitlists, African Americans 54 consistently do not receive organs in
proportion to their demand, despite their placement on the list, donation rates, and public
announcement appeals.55  Whites received 62.1% of organ transplantations in 2007
while blacks and other minorities received 19.3% and 18.6% respectively. 56 Individuals
awaiting organs also are disparately impacted by the current means of prioritizing organ
recipients. During the period of 1999 until 2004, the median wait time for a kidney for
whites was 1,255 days, whereas for African Americans the median wait time was
1,781. 57  These issues are provided a more in depth treatment in other works; 58 my
44. See Government Accountability Office, End-Stage Renal Disease: Characteristics of Kidney
Transplant Recipients, Frequency of Transplant Failures, and, Cost to Medicare,
http://www.gao.gov/htext/d07l1l7.html (Oct. 29, 2007).
45. Kessling, supra n. 39.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. National Kidney Foundation, supra n. 43.
50. See e.g. Mayo Clinic, Our Shared Commitment: 2007 Annual Report 6-10,
http://www.mayoclinic.org/mcitems/mc0700-mc0799/mc0710-2007.pdf (2007).
51. Id.
52. See OPTN, supra n. 28. Of the 56,864 candidates awaiting kidney transplants, 20,225 are African
American. These statistics are based on OPTN data as of Feb. 27, 2004.
53. Goodwin, supra n. 17, at 346.
54. This project uses the terms African American and black interchangeably.
55. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, OPTN: Organ by Ethnicity, http://www.optn.org/
latestData/rptData.asp (at the website, choose category "waiting list" and count "candidates" and select "organ
by ethnicity") (in 2007, listing 25,649 African-American kidney transplant candidates, listing 27,659 African-
Americans awaiting transplant of any organ.).
56. Id.
57. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, OPTN: Kidney Kaplan-Meier Median Waiting Times for
2009]
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purpose here is to unpack a view of human demand that speaks honestly to U.S.
transplant policy.
Finally, the economic tensions and questionable logic that underlie federal organ
transplant policy deserve to be brought into clearer view. In 1973, Medicare began
covering treatments for ESRD. 59 At the time, dialysis was thought to be the best option
for patients, as immune-suppressant medications had yet to be refined, thereby making
transplants a plausible, but riskier option for non-related donors. Fewer than 20,000
patients per year were treated with dialysis at the time. Nevertheless, the costs were
exorbitant, but arguably justified as fewer options existed for these patients. Fifteen
years later, the list of dialysis patients expanded, and the economic consequences of
ESRD became clearer. Twenty years ago, in an article published in Physician Executive,
Hugh Long estimated that the federal government spent in excess of $3.2 billion dollars
per year to treat dialysis patients. 
6 1
The U.S. Renal Data System places current transplant policy in economic contexts.
Medicare covers over 80% of patients with ESRD. 62  Expenditures associated with
ESRD more than doubled during the past thirteen years, from 11.3% of the total
Medicare expenditures to 24.5%, according to the 2008 U.S. Renal Data System's
Annual Report. 63 Accordingly, the report places total Medicare expenditures for treating
chronic kidney disease-the path leading to ESRD-at $49 billion dollars per year.
Authors of the report point out, however, that "these assessments ... likely
underestimate the true . . . cost[s]. ' 64  Over the past decade, economists, law and
economics scholars, and surgeons, including Nobel Laureate Gary Becker, Richard
Epstein, Arthur Matas, Benjamin Hippen, and others, offer incontrovertible data that
billions of dollars would be saved annually if more Americans were transplanted and
moved off of dialysis. 65
11. INTIMATE MARKETS: LESSONS FROM OTHER BIOLOGICAL SUPPLY POOLS
The demand for human biological supply has reached the level of sustained public
outcry, and the spheres for which biological demand grows extend beyond organs.6 6 In
Registrants Listed 1999-2004, http://www.optn.org/latestData/rptStrat.asp (when at the website, choose
category "median waiting time" and choose organ "kidney" and select "waiting time by ethnicity").
58. See Goodwin, supra n. 2; Michele Goodwin, Private Ordering and Intimate Spaces: Why the Ability to
Negotiate is Non-Negotiable, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1367 (2007) [hereinafter Goodwin, Private Ordering];
Michele Goodwin, Deconstructing Legislative Consent Law: Organ Taking, Racial Profiling & Distributive
Justice, 6 Va. J. of Law & Tech 2 (2001) [hereinafter Goodwin, Deconstructing Legislative Consent Law].
59. National Kidney Foundation, Insurance Choice for Medical ESRD Patients, http://www.kidney.org/
news/pubpol/pdf/INSURANCE-CHOICE-MEDICARE-ESRD-MSP-new.pdf (May 2009).
60. Hugh Long, Dialysis-Medicare's ESRD Program, Part I - End State Renal Disease, Physician
Executive (Mar./Apr. 1989) (available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mim0843/is-n2_v 15/ ai8134767).
61. See id.
62. See Government Accountability Office, supra n. 44.
63. See U.S. Renal Data Sys. Annual Rpt., Chapter Five: Costs of Chronic Kidney Disease (2008)
(available at http://www.usrds.org/2008/pdf/ VI 05 2008.pdf).
64. Id.
65. See Sally Satel, When Altruism Isn't Enough 6 (AEI Press 2009); Gary Becker, How Uncle Sam Could
Ease the Organ Shortage, Bus. Week 18 (Jan, 20, 1997); Richard Epstein, Organ Transplants: Is Relying on
Altruism Costing Lives? 4 The Am. Enter 50,55 (Nov./Dec. 1993).
66. Much has been written about organ demand in recent years. Scholars disagree as to systems to resolve
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some cases, demand surpasses supply, as demonstrated by the well documented case of
organs, such as kidneys. Taking a peek into other realms of intimate human biological
demand such as ova, sperm, and babies could prove instructive for scholars, such as
Richard Epstein, who are deeply committed to policy change and achieving equilibrium
between supply and demand for organs.
In reproductive spheres, it appears that "marketized" systems successfully satisfy
consumer demand, as in the cases of ova and sperm. In a third category-babies and
children--data from the U.S. State Department suggests that consumers increasingly
export their demand when domestic pools dry up, and import the babies they want. 67 In
the cases of these biological markets, demand is not met through waitlists and rationing.
Nor are prospective parents required to acquire babies or the makings of babies through
altruistic processes and registering on waitlists at local ova procurement organizations.
Rather, prospective parents pick and choose the sperm, ova, and children they desire by
transparent processes that often include down payments, clear financial terms,
contractual language, and involve very explicit decision-making based on race and
gender.
This section describes the demand for reproductive biologics, and argues that
equilibrium in these markets cannot be credited to an over abundant supply, but rather, to
selective preference shopping that directly connects demand to supply. To be sure, there
are some societal drawbacks to relational preferences that this project acknowledges. 6 8
A. Reproductive Markets
Heterosexual intimacy no longer serves as the exclusive domain of family creation.
Popular understanding of reproduction now includes an intellectual if not social
the demand dilemma, with market proponents on one side of the issue, presumed consent supporters on the
other, and those committed to altruism in a sphere altogether different. Each group, however, agrees that the
demand outstrips supply and that without an increase in organs, deaths will continue to rise. For a view of the
issue from market proponents, see Epstein, supra n. 4; Gary S. Becker & Julio Jorge Elias, Introducing
Incentives in the Market for Live and Cadaveric Organ Donations, 21 J. Econ. Persp. 3 (Summer 2007);
Goodwin, supra n. 17, at 311-13. For a treatment of the issue from a presumed consent perspective, see
Richard H. Thaler & Cass Sunstein, Nudge (Yale U. Press 2008); Linda C. Fentiman, Organ Donation as
National Service: A Proposed Federal Organ Donation Law, 27 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1593, 1602 (1993).
Despite strong evidence that transplant policies that exclusively rely on altruism fail, some commentators find
great salience in that approach and warn against the use of markets to resolve organ transplant shortages. See
Radin, supra n. 11, at 1850; F.L. Delmonico et al., Ethical Incentives-Not Payment-for Organ Donation, 346
New Eng. J. Med. 2002, 2004 (June, 2002). Equally, the incredible demand for ova and sperm is illustrated not
only by media accounts, but also by public advertisements in newspapers, magazines, and on-line. See Sarah B.
Angel, The Value of the Human Egg: An Analysis ofRisk and Reward in Stem Cell Research, 22 Berkeley J. of
Gender, L. & Just. 183, 197-98 (2007). Finally, the demand for babies, particularly white babies in the United
States, is revealed through studies and government statistics. But this demand is not so hidden that the public is
unaware. The increased use of adoption agencies serving children from abroad as a "second-best" option is
illustrated by the dramatic increase in foreign adoptions by U.S. families.
67. See U.S. Dept. of State: Office of Children's Issues, Intercountry Adoption, http://adoption.state.gov
(last accessed Nov. 19, 2009) (the U.S. State Department's guide to intercountry adoption).
68. Scholars who would argue that relational preferences might advantage some groups over others are
correct and their concern to be cautious about legalizing or having the law tolerate preference-shopping is
entirely reasonable. As well, there could be crowding out, meaning that some potential regime participants
might avoid participating in human biological exchange out of concern for the moral implications of preference
shopping in particular human biological domains. Finally, there are social impacts that result from preference
shopping, which currently exist in the adoption realm discussed infra and in greater detail in Michele Goodwin,
Baby Markets: Money and the New Politics of Creating Families (Cambridge U. Press forthcoming 2010).
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acceptance and embrace of diverse family populating unlimited to the traditional notion
of a family growing from a wedded (working) man and woman committed to managing
the home. Instead, homosexual couples, heterosexual couples (without marriage), the
infertile, and single men and women create families with fewer stigmas than ever before.
And, nowhere is the demand for human biologics articulated more forcefully and
transparently than among these groups.
Evidence of persistent and specialized demands for intimate reproductive supplies
extends beyond the realm of discreet advertisements in college newspapers. Indeed, the
open market for reproductive supply is no longer buried in back pages, disguised in the
classified sections as it could be accurately described in the early 1990s. A
contemporary focus on reproductive market politics finds three distinct characteristics.
First, demand expressed through mainstream media, including local newspapers, radio
stations, bulletin boards, and the internet. Second, a market so widely successful that
demand is no longer generalized, but quite specific and tailored to religion, race,
ethnicity, and even sexual orientation. Third, and perhaps most interesting, unlike most
markets, shopping in the intimate reproductive sphere is not controlled by the creative
instincts or business models of designers/suppliers. Rather, the market exists and is
controlled in many ways by those exercising demand. To wit, thinking about suppliers
as clients would not be wholly inaccurate.
To appreciate the function and success of reproductive markets requires
understanding how and why entrepreneurial men and women found the reasonably
precise tipping points for supply while bypassing significant controversy, coercion,
buyer's remorse, and supplier exploitation. In response to creative entrepreneurial
efforts, that began with direct solicitations to college students for ova and sperm, a well
organized billion dollar industry has emerged, which services the unique philosophical,
religious, and ethnic demands of diverse clienteles who all desire similar outcomes:
individual enrichment (expressed by suppliers through financial gain, and buyers by
creating families).
1. What Shapes Reproductive Demand?
For nearly thirty years, reproductive technology has been a primary source of
family making for non-traditional unions and infertile couples.6 9 ART's popularity and
broad use is attributable to several factors. First, reproductive technology's popularity
expanded as more women delayed pregnancy to accommodate or maximize career
options and employment. 70 As women age, their natural ability to reproduce declines,
resulting in chromosomal abnormalities that lead to birth defects, greater chance of
exposure to communicable sexual diseases, and lower sperm count in aging partners.
7 1
69. Since 1981, ART has been used in the United States to help individuals create families. See e.g. U.S.
Dept. of Health and Hum. Serv., 2002 Assisted Reproductive Technology Success Rates, Nat "1 Summary and
Fertility Clinic Reports 1 (2004) (available at http://cdc/gov/ART/ART02/index.htm) [hereinafter CDC 2002
ART Success Rates].
70. Cheryl Wetzstein, American Women Giving Birth Later; College, Careers Defer Motherhood, Wash.
Times PA08 (Dec. 12, 2002) (reporting that in the last three decades from 1970 to 2000 the average age for
American women to have their first birth has increased from 22 to 25).
71. See e.g. Johannes L. H. Evers, Female Subfertility, 360 Lancet 151 (July 13, 2002).
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Science reveals that women's infertility is better captured on a spectrum, rather than
understood as a fixed condition. Women's infertility occurs with a gradual onset after a
certain age. 72 Second, women who might otherwise forego parenting or choose to adopt
are likely responding to social expectations that they should biologically "mother."
73
Third, gay couples can achieve pregnancies and biologically parent through the flexible
menu of options afforded by ART. Finally, gestation is no longer a fixed notion located
in the mother's womb. Prospective parents can hire-out this crucial step in the
reproductive process.
Thus, while the causes leading to infertility vary, but include older matemal age,
74
environment, 75 histories of sexually transmitted diseases, 76 and poor health, the
drawbacks of the condition-the inability to reproduce-can be overcome by the
market's sensitive ability to "create." Studies published in Pediatrics, a leading peer-
review journal, indicate that individually, these factors can cause sterility, infertility,
higher incidences for still birth, miscarriage, congenital delays in fetuses, congenital
malformations, and multiple births. 77 For these reasons, assisted reproduction, including
the purchasing of other women's ova may seem like a logical solution to infertility.
Thus, what and who motivates demand in intimate reproductive spheres is quite
72. See e.g. Sandra Anderson Garcia, Sociocultural and Legal Implications of Creating and Sustaining Life
through Biomedical Technology, 17 J. Leg. Med. 469,492 (1996).
73. The idea of biologically mothering is slightly attenuated, as ART does not necessarily lead to full
biological parenting. For example, the gestational mother might use a third party donor's eggs for the
fertilization process, thereby making the infertile woman a "carrier" of her child, but not the biological mother.
Of course, this raises questions about how motherhood and biological mothering should be defined.
74. See e.g. Suzanne C. Tough et al., Delayed Childbearing and Its Impact on Population Rate Changes in
Lower Birth Weight, Multiple Birth, and Preterm Delivery, 109 Pediatrics 399 (2002); Meredith A. Reynolds et
al., Trends in Multiple Births Conceived Using Assisted Reproductive Technology, United States, 1997-2000,
111 Pediatrics 1159, 1159 (2003) (suggesting that as "more women delay childbearing into their late 30s and
40s," greater complications arise and infertility increases) (the authors note that among the problems arising
with increased maternal age are the "risk[s] for multiple birth among naturally conceived pregnancies");
Jennita Reefhuis et al., Fertility Treatments and Craniosynostosis: California, Georgia, and Iowa, 1993-1997,
111 Pediatrics 1163 (2003); see also Dawn P. Misra and Cande V. Ananth, Infant Mortality Among Singletons
and Twins in the United States During 2 Decades: Effects of Maternal Age, 110 Pediatrics 1163 (2002).
75. Harmful environmental agents have been linked to sterility, infertility, cancer and many other chronic
illnesses. See e.g. Robert Brent et al., A Pediatric Perspective on the Unique Vulnerability and Resilience of
the Embryo and the Child to Environmental Toxicants: The Importance of Rigorous Research Concerning Age
and Agent, 113 Pediatrics 935 (2004) [hereinafter Brent, A Pediatric Perspective]; Robert Brent,
Environmental Causes of Human Congenital Malformations: The Pediatrician's Role in Dealing With These
Complex Clinical Problems Caused by a Multiplicity of Environmental and Genetic Factors, 113 Pediatrics
957 (2004) [hereinafter Brent, Environmental Causes]; Robert W. Miller, How Environmental Hazards in
Childhood Have Been Discovered: Carcinogens, Teratogens, Neurotoxicants, and Others, 113 Pediatrics 945
(2004).
76. Sexually transmitted diseases result in infertility, increased risk of hysterectomy, subfertility, ectopic
pregnancies, and chronic pelvic pain. See e.g. Robert L. Brent & Michael Weitzman, The Pediatrician 's Role
and Responsibility in Educating Parents About Environmental Risks, 113 Pediatrics 1167, 1171 (2004) (noting
"[s]exually transmitted disease can be life-threatening, cause infertility or sterility, and increase the risk of
cervical cancer"); Evers, supra n. 71 (noting that women are delaying childbirth, which in turn increases the
probability of sexually transmitted diseases, sperm decline in their partners, and a reduction in the quality and
quantity of viable eggs); Nadereh Pourat et al., Medicaid Managed Care and STDs: Missed Opportunities to
Control the Epidemic: Lack of Organizational Priority is the Major Barrier to Providing Care for Those With
Sexually Transmitted Diseases in Medicaid, 21 Health Affairs 228, 229 (June 2002) (finding "[tihe burden of
illness from STDs is exacerbated by infertility, pregnancy complications, cancer, and a greater susceptibility to
HIV infection.") (footnote omitted); Brian M. Willis & Barry S. Levy, Child Prostitution: Global Health
Burden, Research Needs, and Interventions, 359 Lancet 1417 (2002).
77. See e.g. Brent, Environmental Causes, supra n. 75, at 998.
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elastic. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) helps to further unpack demand
dynamics. The CDC serves as a unique data sources in the reproductive realm; its
researchers estimate that about 15% of women of reproductive age are infertile. 78 The
agency derives this figure from reported medical data; about nine million women in the
United States annually seek medical treatment or advice regarding infertility. 79  The
CDC describes infertility services to include "medical tests to diagnose infertility,
medical advice and treatments to help a woman become pregnant, and services other
than routine prenatal care to prevent miscarriage." 80  Arguably, the demand for
information and services related to infertility spills over into the demand for assisted
reproductive services, specifically the purchasing of healthy ova and active sperm.
The increased demand for ART is understandable when one considers the
expanded array of options afforded to infertile women, unmarried or single individuals,
and gay couples. For gay couples, ART trumps the heterosexist instinct of Mother
Nature, or as Martha Ertman suggests, assisted reproduction relieves same sex partners
from the genetic discrimination imposed by nature. 8 1 ART also appeals to men and
women in whose genes lurk genetic mutations and diseases. For them, ART helps to
circumvent traditional reproductive processes and thus reduce or eliminate completely
the risks of transmitting disabling diseases to their offspring. Women report that the
services offered by fertility clinics maximize efficiency and convenience, while
minimizing stigma by allowing the purchase of sperm over the internet. 82  Unlike
adoption processes, which can be slow, and sometimes restricted to young, heterosexual
couples, purchasing sperm and ova affords the opportunity to non-partnered men and
women as well as couples to complete their families without the added social stigma,
bureaucracy, and frustration of appearing to be genetically weak, inferior, or inadequate
to parent.
Recent studies also confirm socially complicated data; that biologically teenagers
and women of college age are at the optimal reproductive stage. 83 By contrast, well-
accomplished women barely in their thirties, according to scientific research, are
reproductively old. 84  Thus, the U.S. social paradigms for ideal or preferred
motherhood- based on economic and social maturity-do not comport with
reproductive roadmaps constructed by nature. Specifically, scientists report that fertility
decline begins for women in their thirties, with a dramatic decrease in fertility at and
78. See e.g. CDC 2002 ART Success Rates, supra n. 69, at 1. Unfortunately, the information relied upon
by the CDC is somewhat dated; it was gathered as part of a study conducted over ten years ago from the 1995
National Survey of Family Growth. Id. See also Val Davajan & Robert Israel, Diagnosis and Medical
Treatment of Infertility, in Infertility: Perspectives from Stress and Coping Research 17, 17 (Annette L. Stanton
& Christine Dunkel-Schetter eds., Plenum Press 1991) (stating "it has been estimated that between 10% and
15% of married couples in the United States are infertile."); Stephen L. Corson, Conquering Infertility: A
Guide for Couples 1 (rev. ed., Prentice Hall Press 1990) ("In the United States, approximately 14 to 16 percent
of all couples attempting to get pregnant have difficulty conceiving, and are defined by fertility therapists as
being infertile.").
79. See e.g. CDC 2002 ART Success Rates, supra n. 69.
80. Id. at 3.
81. Martha M. Ertman, Whats Wrong with a Parenthood Market-A New and Improved Theory of
Commodification, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 1 (2003).
82. Jennifer Egan, Wanted: A Few GoodSperm, 155 N.Y. Times E44, E46 (Mar. 19, 2006).
83. See Anna Muirine, Making Babies, 137 U.S. News & World Rep. 60, 62 (Sept. 27, 2004).
84. Id.
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over the age of thirty five.g5 Along with the decrease in fertility, there is a heightened
probability for birth defects in children conceived by "reproductively" older women.
86
Therefore using the ova of younger women cannot be attributed exclusively to infertility,
but rather must be understood in its broader biological contexts for many couples.
Chromosomal abnormalities, for example, occur in 40-50% of pregnancies in women
ages 30-35.87 According to a report commissioned by the Alan Guttmacher Institute,
"the share of embryos that women produce that are chromosomally abnormal rises .. . to
about 70% in women 40 and over."88 Technology now affords infertile families the
ability to conceive, as well as those who have diminished capacity to conceive due to
delay in childbearing.
8 9
But the demand for biological reproductive materials cannot be classified as
exclusively a "woman's issue," as men's reproductive health appears on the decline. 90
A few years ago European scientists uncovered startling data regarding male sperm
depletion. Their studies discovered that "sperm counts have dropped by almost a third in
a decade. ' 9 1  A study of over 7,000 men who visited the Aberdeen Fertility Centre
between 1989 and 2002 revealed "average sperm concentrations fell by nearly 30 per
cent."
92
2. Contoured Supply Pools
Relational preference helps to place in context the demand side of reproductive
biologics. Unmistakably, relational preferences matching supply pools aids in the
equilibrium achieved and sustained overtime in reproductive demand and supply spheres.
For example, Leland Traiman, Founder and Director of Rainbow Flag Health
Services located in San Francisco, California, recruits openly gay and bisexual men
specifically for supplying sperm to couples that prefer gay and bisexual men.
9 3
According to Traiman, Rainbow Flag Health Services & Sperm Bank (also known as
GaySpermBank.com) "is a unique business," 94 supplying gay men's sperm to lesbian
and bisexual women:
Although we have some heterosexual clients, Rainbow Flag primarily serves individual
Lesbians and Lesbian couples who believe that children have a right to know their
85. Id.
86. See e.g. S. London, Risk of Pregnancy-Related Death Is Sharply Elevated for Women 35 and Older, 36
Persps. on Sexual & Reprod. Health 89, 89 (Mar. 2004) (noting that women 40 or older have five times as high
a risk of dying from pregnancy-related causes than women 25-29 years old).
87. Patricia Edmonds, Helping People Have Healthy Babies, Washingtonian Mag. 175 (Dec. 2004).
88. Id.
89. Reynolds et al., supra n. 74 (looking at ART data and multiple births statistics). For many infertile
women, using ART is perceived as more than a rational choice; it is a blessing. See e.g. Nuala O'Connor,
Open Letter to the Archbishop, Irish Times P10 (Mar. 6, 1999).
90. Sam Lister, Careful, Lads, That Laptop Might Burn Your Genes, The Times (Dec. 9, 2004) (available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article400872.ece).
91. Id.
92. Id. Commentators identify a number of factors that contribute to male infertility, including obesity,
drug use, alcohol, and smoking. Other factors include exposure to laptops "pesticides, chemicals and
radioactive material." Id.
93. See Leland Traiman, Guidelines But No Guidance: GaySpermBankcom vs. FDA, 9 J. Gender, Race &
Just. 613, 614 (2006).
94. Id.
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biological fathers while they are going up. Most of our donors are Gay men who have
chosen not to raise children themselves but still wish to procreate and have contact with
their biological offspring. Many Lesbians, fearing misunderstanding from heterosexual
donors, prefer Gay donors. Symbiosis. Rainbow Flag Health Services & Sperm Bank
is one of a handful of fertility services and sperm banks that does not discriminate on
the basis of sexual orientation with regard to both donors and recipients.
9 5
Additionally, Traiman and his colleagues "recruit donors whose identity will be revealed
to the mother when the child is three months old."
96
Ethnicity matching represents a vibrant second category of relational preferences at
play. In Confessions of a Serial Egg Donor, Julia Derek offers a revealing account of
her introduction into supplying human biologics. 97  Derek's personal trek into the
reproductive realm provides stunning insight into relational preferences and the tipping
point for supplying intimate goods. She discloses the following reflection, "I read the ad
in the [Washington Post] before me once more: 'Egg Donor Wanted'. Infertile couple
searching for tall (5'8" minimum), athletic, green eyes, brunette egg donor between the
ages of 18-30. Preferably from Northern or Eastern Europe. Very discreet.
Compensation: $3,500.' " 98 Swedish, tall, and green-eyed, Derek found a financial
calling that would allow her to stay in the U.S. (as her savings were thinning), and she
was sympathetic to struggling families trying to conceive.
Derek spent little time contemplating against what seemed like an obvious choice
for her: "[w]hy become a waitress when you could become an egg donor?" 99 For her,
"marriage and having kids weren't things high up on [her] to-do list in life." 100 As she
confesses, what she desired was a career and boyfiend---"in that order."
' 10 1
The critical factors in what would become a series of successful egg donations by
Derek directly related to the power of relational intersections. Those intersections
implicitly, if not explicitly, related to preferences motivating reproductive purchasers,
particularly race, height, and eye color. Not to be overlooked, however, are the triggers
that provide compelling tipping points for donors and sellers like Derek. For Julia
Derek, a multiple-time ova provider, compensation mattered, but so did an understanding
that her contribution was not like bartering a child 10 2 but rather, as she describes it, "like
giving someone one of my hairs." 10 3 More importantly, Derek realized that her unique
profile matched the preferences demanded by Americans seeking to create families
through assisted reproduction.
Derek's personal journey into the realm of ART offers unparalleled insight into the
relational tipping points in the demand-supply courtship of reproductive biologics. For
example, racial relational preferences play out across ethnicities. Southeast Asians are
95. Id.
96. Id.; see also Rainbow Flag Health Services, Known Donor Insemination, http://gayspermbank.com/
index.html (last accessed Oct. 27, 2009).
97. Julia Derek, Confessions of a Serial Egg Donor (Adrenaline Books 2004).
98. Id. at 5.
99. Id. at 11.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Derek, supra n. 97, at 8.
103. Id.
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reported to pay up to $100,000 for the right ova source, advertising near the campuses of
Stanford and the California Institute of Technology. 104 To them, caste matters. Even
amongst African Americans, relational preferences matter. When Dr. Jane Doe, a
Chicago psychologist (and participant in the 2006 Baby Markets Roundtable), sought
reproductive services, she specifically targeted highly educated, Ivy-League educated
black women. As she learned during her search for the "right donor," other black
mothers had chosen a similar path. She wanted a surrogate that matched her racial and
academic background.
Among most women in the market for reproductive biologics, choice matters. If
this is correct, what the reproductive market has gotten right is understanding and
accommodating preference. A few years ago, the New York Times reported that just one
of the more popular sperm banks, sent out nearly ten thousand vials of sperm per year to
women across the country. 10 5 The demand for the California Cryobank's popular
services reflects-in part-a growing use of human reproductive material. As well,
California Cryobank ships out sperm categorized not only by race, but also for very
selective preference shopping by education-and, in some cases, accent. As one U.S.
Professor confidentially revealed to me, her donor matched very specific preferences not
only by race, eye color, and hair color, but also vocal accent (the donor was British).
3. What the Numbers Reveal
Unlike organ procurement, which at best satisfies a slim fraction of demand,
reproductive pools seemingly meet the needs of prospective parents. Consider that in
2001, 384 fertility clinics were reportedly in operation. 106  Those clinics reported
performing 107,587 ART cycles to the CDC, resulting in 29,344 live births and 40,687
babies. 10 7  To be clear, not all of these births were the result of ova and sperm
purchases. 108  However, 99% of the services used at those clinics were for in vitro
fertilization, and nearly 16,000 cycles were from third-party ova providers.
Data from sperm acquisition is less conclusive as some women and couples bypass
the clinic process and obtain this resource independently through other third-party
means. Nevertheless, ova and sperm are increasingly acquired from third parties and
most clinics respond aggressively to that demand. 10 9 In a 2007 CDC study, 93% of
clinics reported providing services for procedures involving third-party eggs and 67% for
third-party embryos. Most interestingly, 91% of their services are to single women. 110
104. The advertisements, some full page, have run in the Stanford University student newspaper. In one
such ad placed by Families 2000, a reproductive service agency in Southern California, the physical and
intellectual desires of would-be shoppers are very clear, with preference for a white, under 30 woman "and an
athlete 'of proven college level ability.' " For an ova exchange from a woman matching those characteristics,
$100,000 would be paid as well as all expenses. San Francisco Associated Press, Couple Offers $100K to Egg
Donor, http://www.gettingpregnantbook.com/expensive-eggs_l.html (last accessed Nov. 19, 2009).
105. Egan, supra n. 82.
106. Ctrs. For Disease Control and Prevention, Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART): Introduction to the
2001 National Report, http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART0l/nation.htm (last accessed Nov. 1, 2009).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Tessa Mayes, Students Sell Their 'Anglo-look' Eggs for Thousands on Internet, Sunday Times (Aug.
10, 2003) (available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article862299).
110. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) Report: National
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Most notable in the expansion of ART services were the number of clinics that
emerged to further address reproductive demand. Between 2001 and 2007, nearly an
additional 50 clinics opened and ART cycles increased by over 30%. According to the
CDC's 2007 Annual ART Success Rates Report, (the most recent year for data
compilation), "142,415 ART cycles [were] performed," which resulted "in 43,408 live
births (deliveries of one or more living infants) and 57,564 infants."
1 11
This data points to ART's significant popularity, use, and growth over the past ten
years. 112 Such dynamics are not apparent in the organ transplant realm, despite twenty
five years of federal oversight, data keeping, monitoring, and control. Nor can this be
explained by the perceived less invasive aspects of ART. Ova donation, as it turns out, is
far more involved than a kidney transplant; both require general anesthetic, but supplying
ova necessitates daily hormone injections leading to the extraction. This process has
been described as "ovary blasting," exponentially multiplying ova beyond a natural
month's supply. And, ova exchanges far exceed the transfer of organs (i.e., more ova
implants from third parties take place each year than organ transplants), although both
spheres exact intimate biological exchanges.
Unfortunately, the organ procurement realm cannot make similar claims. Instead
of expanding a third-party pool, organ procurement's rigidly conscribed supplier pool
results in only partial success in the transplant realm. Critics suggest that comparisons
between organs and reproductive supply are far too tenuous and inexact. They point to
specific health distinctions, including that ova and sperm are regenerative, unlike kidneys
where there is only one spare, not several or hundreds in the cases of ova and sperm.
They explain that organ extraction requires sophisticated, invasive surgery, unlike sperm
mining.
The parallels between reproductive demand and that of organs may not be exact,
but are nonetheless informative and particularly compelling for those interested in saving
lives through third-party organ exchanges. In both instances a health condition or
impediment is overcome by the use of third-party biological supply. In the case of
organs, that biological supply, such as kidneys, can save lives.
B. Demand for Babies
Babies and children represent a third category of demand for the intimate and
biological, although generally not articulated as such. According to the Evan B.
Donaldson Adoption Institute, an organization that collects data on adoption, 1.5 million
children residing in the United States are adopted. 113 Each year, roughly a half million
Summary: 2007, http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/ARTINSR.aspx?SelectedYear=2007 (last accessed Oct. 27,
2009);see also Keith Alan Byers, Infertility and In Vitro Fertilization: A Growing Needfor Consumer-Oriented
Regulation of the In Vitro Fertilization Industry, 18 J. Leg. Med. 265, 275-76 (1997).
111. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Assisted Reproductive Technology: Home,
http://www.cdc.gov/ ART/ (last accessed Oct. 27, 2009).
112. See e.g. CDC 2002 ART Success Rates, supra n. 69, at 71; see also Anna Mulrine, supra n. 83
(reporting that a clinic in Las Vegas services infertile couples that have "traveled from out of state to try
again.").
113. The Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Inst., Overview of Adoption in the United States,
http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/FactOverview.html (last accessed Oct. 27, 2009).
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women seek to adopt, 114 and although this population represents a decrease in the
percentage of women seeking to adopt since 1973,115 it nonetheless represents powerful
evidence of baby demand. About 130,000 adoption attempts per year result in a couple
receiving a child.
According to the National Center for State Courts, the demand for babies is not
entirely satisfied domestically. In fact, the reporting mechanisms for domestic adoptions
remain woefully inadequate, as states "are not legally required to record the number of
private, domestic adoptions," 116 and thus the "total number of adoptions each year has
not been comprehensively compiled since 1992."
117
Adoptions also involve a high level of negotiating that reveals relational thinking
and decision-making. Some prospective parents will satisfy their desire for children by
negotiating and adopting abroad. And an altogether different category of prospective
parents, sympathetic to the plights of children in foster care, will adopt from that pool.
But foster care adoptions represent only 15% of the total number of domestic
adoptions. 
1 1 8
Interestingly, adoption represents converged demand and supply pools, though it
tends to be viewed as unidirectional rather than bidirectional. In other words, children
also exhibit a demand for parents, and wait for that interest to be satisfied by the right
type of supply.
Of the three categories of demand articulated in this project-organs, reproductive
(sperm and ova), and babies-adoptions fit a unique space, as more than half the U.S.
population has some personal relationship to the process. Nearly 60% of Americans are
personally connected to adoption-as they know someone who has adopted or is
adopted. 119 Further, adoption politics are deeply contextualized. For example, adoption
clearly inures a benefit to the child relieved from foster care, group homes, and other
non-nuclear, non-committed living environments, and thus the imagery of "best interests
for the child[ren]" would appropriately apply in most cases to those so fortunate to be
adopted. Yet, adoption would mistakenly be described as being exclusively or primarily
focused on relieving child suffering. 120  If such were the case, children in the United
States would not languish in foster care while Americans choose to adopt from abroad.
Between two ends of a spectrum, one representing child welfare and the other "adult
114. Id.
115. Anjani Chandra et al., Adoption, Adoption Seeking, and Relinquishment for Adoption in the United
States, No. 306 Advance Data from Vital and Health Statistics of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, National center for Health Statistics, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 1, 5 (May
11, 1999).
116. The Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Inst., supra n. 113.
117. Id.
118. Victor Eugene Flango & Carol R. Flango, How Many Children Were Adopted in 1992, 74 Child
Welfare 1018, 1024 (1995).
119. The Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Inst., supra n. 113 (stating, "[t]he Adoption Institute's 1997 Public
Opinion Benchmark survey found that 58% of Americans know someone who has been adopted, has adopted a
child or has relinquished a child for adoption" (footnote omitted)).
120. See Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Adoption Laws and Practices in 2000: Serving Whose Interests? 33 Fam.
L.Q. 677, 680-86 (2000) (noting that adoptions functioned as a child welfare model for abandoned, abused,
neglected, and orphaned youth).
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needs," the latter influences U.S. adoptions far more than imagined. 121 Instead, adoption
is more accurately characterized as a means of creating families, and one that largely
anticipates and fulfills adult desires.
As well, adoptions illustrate quite clearly the manner in which relationships and
preferences associated with relationships, including age, gender, race, and religion,
matter significantly to the acquiring parties. 122 Thus, adoption as an intimate biological
market offers compelling evidence affirming both the interrogative and analytical thrusts
of this project; Americans want to maximize relational preferences in the exchange of
human biological supply. In the context of adoption, Americans are quite specific about
the type of children they seek to bring home.
123
Children adopted from abroad tend to be younger than children adopted from U.S.
foster care. The Evan B. Donaldson Institute reports that 90% of the children adopted
from abroad are under the age of five, 124 while more often than not, the children adopted
from foster care are five years old or more. 125  Americans demonstrate relational
preferences based on race. For example, white families articulate a stronger preference
for white babies, and as a result pass over needy black babies and children in foster
care. 126  Blacks also articulate relational preferences and relational exclusions. For
several decades, the National Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW) lobbied
against white families adopting black children. 127  Some scholars suggest that the
demand for black babies declined after their efforts. Nevertheless, according to a recent
study, white women expressed a preference for adopting a child with severe physical or
mental disabilities rather than a preference for adopting a black child. 
12 8
Relational preferences are demonstrated by baby costs, too. White babies are in
high demand, and as a result their adoptions command higher fees than their Asian,
Latino, and black counterparts. Couples may spend upwards of $50,000 to adopt a
healthy, white infant. 129 Black infants, however, are adopted for as little as $4,000.130
Adoption agencies attempt to clarify this discrepancy by explaining that black children
121. See Michele Goodwin, supra n. 68.
122. Chandra et al., supra n. 115, at 4-5.
123. Id.
124. The Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Inst., supra n. 113 (International adoption data is for 1998); U.S.
Dept. of Just.: Immigration and Naturalization Servs. Statistics Branch, 1998 Statistical Yearbook of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service 65 (Nov. 2000) (available at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/
aboutins/statistics/imm98list.htm) (citing table fifteen which compiles international adoption data for 1998).
125. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., Children's Bureau, AFCARS Report: No. 6 5 (June 2001)
(available at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/publications /afcars/June200l.htm) (foster care data is for
1999).
126. See e.g. Judith K. McKenzie, Adoption of Children with Special Needs, 3 The Future of Children 62,
65-66 (Spring 1993) (characterizing children of color as having "special needs" resulting in more difficult
placement into an adoptive home).
127. See Natl. Assoc. of Black Soc. Workers, Preserving Families of African Ancestry,
http://www.nabsw.org/mserver/PreservingFamilies.aspx (last accessed Oct. 27, 2009).
128. Chandra et al., supra n. 115.
129. See Bonnie Miller Rubin, Adoption Bill Targets Legal Loopholes,
http://www.staterepsara.com/Press%20releases/Chicago%20Tribune-%2Adoption%20bill%20targets%201oo
pholes.pdf (last updated Mar. 27, 2005) (describing how the price of a [presumably white] American infant can
"hit the $50,000 mark.").
130. See Dusty Rhodes, Baby Trade, http://www.illinoistimes.com/springfield/article-1823-baby-trade.html
(last updated Feb. 17, 2005).
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are more difficult to place than white children 13 1 and therefore the fees associated with
adopting white children are higher. This analytical flaw could be characterized as a
means of obfuscation, though it is true that black children wait longer for permanent
placements. 13 2  Clearly, it does not cost more to do less. Adoption transaction fees
reflect relational preferences, and thusly are not based purely on the labor and
transactions involved. 
133
Adoptions are heavily influenced by market politics, including the valuing of
babies based on factors such as ethnicity and race. This helps to explain why adoption
fees vary across race and age. Thus, although white children are adopted very quickly,
adoption agencies command the maximum fees for their placement, despite spending
comparatively less time on their cases than international adoptions or attempts to place
older children, or black babies. It would seem that less work would result in less pay and
lower fees. Instead, fee structures based on race give evidence that adoption is subject to
relational preferences that evince real power and meaning within the forces of supply and
demand. 134  Fee structures that demand higher premiums for white babies and
dramatically lower payments to adopt black babies and children are consistent with a
market based approach in U.S. adoptions.
As the intuition of this project suggests, racial preference matters; bi-racial
children also attract higher fees than black babies. 135 Why biracial babies are placed
into adoption also reveals parenting preferences, and studying this could prove
informative. Consequently, even though an "estimated 2 million American families" are
looking to adopt, the majority will pass over black babies for children from abroad. 
136
If relationships matter in the supply and demand of intimate goods, should the law
13 1. See e.g. McKenzie, supra n. 126 (characterizing children of color as having "special needs" resulting in
more difficult placement into an adoptive home).
132. See e.g. Carla M. Curtis & Ramona W. Denby, Impact of the Adoption and Safe Families Act (1997) on
Families of Color: Workers Share Their Thoughts, 85 Fam. in Soc.: The J. of Contemporary Soc. Serv. 71
(2004) (stating generally that children of color wait longer in foster care to be adopted than do their white
counterparts).
133. To the extent that discrimination was legally enforced and social values with regard to reproduction
were delineated according to race and socio-economic status, adoption services were affected just as any other
social institution. Thus, the best interest of young black children was limited to a model that restricted those
adoptions to black families, a model that the National Black Social Workers Organization would later endorse.
See Larry Elder, Exporting Black/White Adoptions, http://www.newsmodo.com/2005/02/28/exporting-black-
white-adoptions/display.jsp?id=3811594 (last updated Feb. 28, 2005) (noting that "[a]ccording to the National
Adoption Center, government still allows agencies to use variables to calculate the 'best interest of the child.'
"); Jehnna Irene Hanan, The Best Interest of the Child: Eliminating Discrimination in the Screening ofAdoptive
Parents, 27 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 167, 176-77 (1997) (describing the National Association of Black Social
Workers' objection to interracial adoption as negatively affecting the formation of the child's racial identity).
As a contemporary model, the disproportionately low adoption rate for black children in foster care gives some
indication of the continued illusory nature of adoption as a specialized child-focused welfare service model.
See Richard P. Barth, Effects of Age and Race on the Odds of Adoption versus Remaining in Long-Term Out-
of-Home Care, 76 Child Welfare 285, 288 (1997) (noting that white children in the Michigan foster care
system are three times more likely to be adopted than black children).
134. See e.g. Martha M. Ertman, What's Wrong with a Parenthood Market?: A New and Improved Theory of
Commodification, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 10 (2003) ("Children who are racial minorities, such as African-American
children, are sometimes cheaper to adopt than white children, a differential that seems to turn more on supply
and demand than on agencies expending more money to place white children.").
135. See Rhodes, supra n. 130 (describing how some adoption agencies charge more for biracial children
than African American children).
136. See 60 Minutes, "Born in USA; Adopted in Canada" (CBS Mar. 10, 2005) (TV broad.).
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have anything to say about it, and if so, what? For decades relational preference
shopping explicitly by race has been ignored in the contexts of adoption, and some might
argue that there are compelling reasons why the selection of a child's race should be left
to the adopting parties even if it leads to significant social externalities, including passing
over children who have waited longer in the nation's foster care system, reifying racial
stigmas, and secondary problems related to children's prolonged stays in foster care.
Between the spheres of adoption in which race is explicitly considered, and organs
where the federal government prohibits such considerations, a gap exists. Both organs
and children derive from the biologic, but are treated differently for purposes of
distribution. Is the discrepancy justified once placed in this context? An organ cannot
comprehend that its de-selection or rejection was the result of relational preference, but a
child might. This project proposes flipping the analysis--or inverting it a bit-to
consider whether we should care at all about these very private transactions, and if for
strong public policy reasons, we might wish to expand relational preferences to other
domains of intimate goods.
1II. RELATIONAL PREDICATES
Part III undertakes a very brief examination of relational theory. It does not
attempt to survey the field, 137 as doing so would be beyond the scope of this project.
Instead, this article offers two very distinct approaches to relational theory; relational
theory as a negotiating instrument or space and relational theory as an analytical model
to capture affinity group loyalty, attention, sympathy, and empathy.
This article does not claim that relational theory resolves or clarifies all demand-
side problems. Nor does the ambition of this project limit itself to a thought experiment
about the analytics of relational theory, as it does present an important pragmatic
question-would the utilization of preference selection in organ procurement increase
supply? The scope of this project is intentionally narrow and pragmatic. 138 Its claims
about the muscularity of relational theory applies first as a question, and then as a tool
for achieving equilibrium in specific types of markets. The section acknowledges the
contours and diverse applications of relational theory.
A. Relational Theory As A Tool To Understand Legal Transactions
Relational theory is predicated on two distinct contributions to legal thought. First,
relational theorists contend that the extra legal informs and influences the legal, meaning
137. The application of relational theory to socio-legal problems is quite extensive. See Craig Christensen,
Legal Ordering of Family Values: The Case of Gay and Lesbian Families, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1299, 1414-16
(2007) (arguing that a relational approach to the jurisprudence involving same sex couples would bring about
social justice). Relational theory has been applied to copyright scholarship. See Carys J. Craig, Reconstructing
the Author-Self" Some Feminist Lessons For Copyright Law, 15 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Policy & L. 207, 234
(2007) (arguing that "the legitimacy and success of copyright law depends upon a theoretical framework
informed by feminist theory and capable of embracing the notion of the relational self/author and the principles
of dialogism.").
138. Relational theory proponents embrace and apply the theory broadly, from contract discourse and
feminist jurisprudence to race theory, physics, philosophy, anthropology and more. In each sphere, the term
"relational" becomes a hybrid. This article does not intend to overlook the fine contributions of talented
scholars plowing the fields of relational/relationship theory, as there is a growing and robustly emerging crop
of scholarship in this domain.
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that certain values and affinities inform how legislatures shape, courts interpret, and the
executive enforces the law. Taken a step further, as this article does, pareto superior
markets in the biological realm are not only marked by relational pairings, but to achieve
equilibrium, relational preferences must be maximized. In the contexts of supply and
demand of intimate goods, relational theory places a finger on what satisfies market
demand.
In traditional legal contexts, relational theory purports that individuals' use of law
is largely shaped by the contours of relationships. The two best known relational
theorist, Carol Gilligan and Ian Macneil, hail from very different camps of the law, and,
although Macneil would later replace "relational contract theory" with "essential contract
theory" to describe his work, the substance of his approach to relational theory remains
substantively the same. 139  His relational approach demanded attention to the factors
beyond the language of contracts, suggesting they were important for the purpose of
determining what the contract truly meant. 14  Macneil's approach destabilized
conventional contract theory, but also gained an ardent following.
Macneil's relational approach relies heavily on ex post considerations of ex ante
behaviors in an effort to achieve social justice in contracts. Yet, that formula often fails
to offer much relief to those less capable of proving their ex ante intent. Nevertheless,
the import of his contribution to contract law was that social justice or "getting it right"
mattered as much if not more than terms the acting parties disputed. 
14 1
This was the hallmark of Macneil's scholarship, both disturbing conventional
wisdom by suggesting that exogenous factors influence the formulation of contracts as
much as if not more than the language of the legal document itself. Arguably, Macneil's
scholarship in this domain revealed the relative weakness in what the law purports to
accomplish. That is to say, if contracting does not truly reflect the terms reduced to
paper, then predictability is certainly undermined. In short, Macneil's approach to
relational theory was to suggest that contracts cannot be defined exclusively by what is
reduced to paper. Instead, under his framework contracts are a matter of negotiations
and subjective understandings between negotiating parties. 142
139. lan Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich
Classificatory Apparatus, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 854, 900-01 (1978). Macneil urged a view of contracts that
attracted as many supporters as detractors, but offered keen insights into the formulation of contracts, or the
sociology of contract-making. Macneil suggested that contracts form based on connections and relationships.
Relational contracts are, in general terms, those in which the parties' obligations are not fully specified at the
outset, as in the "classical" form of contract. Macneil, much like Stuart Macaulay, emphasized that contracts
involved social behaviors and connections not reduced to writing. To Macneil and Macaulay, an ideal if not
appropriate approach to interpreting contracts involves reaching beyond the language of contract to examine
the actors, studying their interactions, how they negotiate, and the contexts in which they negotiated to achieve
just outcomes. Id.
140. Id.
141. The inefficiencies and pitfalls inherent in Macneil's approach seem clear at the start, as he requires
looking beyond the language of contract, which necessarily demands more resources, including time, money,
and possibly third parties, while forcing courts to evaluate subjective intentions. Such an approach reveals
itself to be counter-contractual in an instant. And employing more resources to interpret the true meaning of a
contract will not necessarily result in desirable outcomes for contracting parties lacking resources. Thus, as a
social justice project, Macneil's approach has its share of weaknesses. Id.
142. Macneil urged that lawyers, specifically contract scholars, would benefit from learning sociology,
anthropology, and the psychology of contracts. After all, how would lawyers come to know what the parties
expected from their contracts without having a more sophisticated set of tools to unpack the true intentions of
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The starting point for most relational approaches is the conviction that social goals
can be achieved by examining the relationship between negotiating parties, whether in
tort, contract, family law, or constitutional jurisprudence. Feminist legal theory offers no
exception to this approach and its conclusions. 14 3  Feminist legal scholars claim to
employ relational theory as a tool to unearth meaning. 144  That is to say, their
scholarship examines the interconnections between legal actors as a first step in
determining what social justice would demand of the legal response. 145 The intersection
of feminist legal theory and relational theory is concerned about how courts interpret
what legal actors intended or should have intended across a sphere of legal doctrines. 146
B. Relational Theory As A Tool To Understand Human Dynamics
Thus, a second distinct view of relational theory recognizes that it is predicated on
the assumption that affinity group status engenders important values such as empathy,
sympathy, attention, and understanding. In other words, feminist legal theory urges that
(shared/similar) life experiences form the core of relational bonds. Feminist legal theory
suggests that biology cannot be the exclusive site where relational bonds form. Rather,
the social practices that define, construct, and enforce the status and liberty of women
forges a bond between women based on similar life experience. Arguably, then, it is
because of social history, cultural norms, and life experiences that women are implicitly
biased in favor of other women. According to this approach, women bring a more
universalized understanding of gender empowerment/disempowerment to most social
and personal interactions. Girlhood or womanhood becomes a shorthand that permits
(and expects) trust, loyalty, and confidence to emerge between women. 147
Feminist relational theory presumes a kinship based on the implicit
understanding-whether accurate or not-that most women and girls share a set of
universal dynamics that essentially link them. And it is this supposition of shared
experience and assumption that experiences are inherently interchangeable or fungible
among groups that inspires empathy, sympathy, understanding, and attention. Most
importantly, feminist relational theory emphasizes bi-directionality and mutuality as key
components of the feminist relationship structure. 148 Feminist legal theory provides a
compelling framework to understand what motivates and inspires trust, empathy,
affection, sympathy, and attention from among members of that group. At its core,
contracting parties? Id. at 893-94.
143. As a caveat, I recognize the potential for the conflation of legal ideas when examining feminist legal
theory. It would be a mistake to characterize the intersection of feminist legal theory and relational theory as
one well defined body of scholarship. To do so would be reductive.
144. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice 24-63 (Harv. U. Press 1993); Sharon Freedberg, Re-Examining
Empathy: A Relational-Feminist Point of View, 52 Soc. Work 251, 258 (July 2007).
145. Stephanie S. Covington, The Relational Theory of Women's Psychological Development in Female
Offenders: Critical Perspectives and Effective Interventions 113 (Ruth Zaplin ed., Aspen Pub. 1998) (arguing
the importance of a relational critique in the criminal justice system, particularly as related to women).
146. Id.
147. See Virginia Goldner, Toward a Critical Relational Theory of Gender in Gender in Psychoanalytic
Space: Between Clinic and Culture 63 (Muriel Dimen & Virginia Goldner eds., Other Press 2002). Goldner
emphasizes that the dichotomized gender norm evolves from and is reified by "cultural practices and relational
arrangements that construct and enforce" inequitable gender norms. Id. at 74.
148. Freedberg, supra n. 144.
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feminist relational theory anticipates predictable life experiences that plot a course
through a woman's life. This approach to relational theory accommodates both a social
construction of gendered norms as well as the biological, both of which become
intertwined at times. As to the biological, the presumptions are quite clear and
unnecessary to capture and explore in excessive detail here; women's shared biology
from puberty to pregnancy, labor, birthing, and menopause are unique to their gender
(although not all women will ever become pregnant). To state the obvious, men cannot
biologically experience any of these life occurrences. Presumably, these shared
biological experiences inure a valuable understanding between women about those
specific experiences.
Biological landmarks across women's lives do not occur in vacuums. Instead, they
involve interactions with other people and institutions. In the case of a pregnancy, most
women in the United States will give birth at hospitals after intense contractions of at
least several hours. Part of this process will involve pain and chewing on ice chips-
benign but relatable details acknowledged by women who have given birth. This process
of living the biological embodies a unique social dimension often defined by cultural and
social interactions that occur alongside biological landmarks. Biological experiences
inform how women recognize and predict-emotional (pleasure, stress, joy, and anger)
as well as physical (pain and relief)-experiences in other women. It is the relatable
quality of the biological that forges sympathy and understanding.
Sharing mutual life occurrences advantages women over men in their capacity to
intuit, offer support, and empathize with women navigating similar biological spaces.
Relational theory is also predicated on the notion that social constructions and practices
uniquely situate women. Feminist legal scholars offer historic examples such as
coverture laws and the denial of a right to vote. 14 9 More recent examples such as
employment discrimination (lower pay than male counterparts for similar work) and
domestic work (caring for children and older relatives) are used to bolster the claim that
social patterns that create social affinities based on gender are deeply entrenched in
society. 150
Aside from the framework's tendency to err slightly on essentializing women and
the weaknesses in its long-term predictability, relational theory's constructive intuition is
nonetheless apparent. The intuitional component of relational theory-that women will
bond over similar life experiences-is a rational, reasonable hypothesis. Indeed,
empirical evidence suggests that the intuition of relational theory in the feminist context
is fairly accurate. And while it is reasonable to assume that as social norms change, the
predictability of the life experiences of women will necessarily diminish, certain core
features of society, biology, and law remain entrenched.
149. See e.g., Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the
Family, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947 (2002) (calls for restructuring of sex discrimination doctrine).
150. See e.g., Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1881 (2000) (arguing for a restricting of paid
work to allow men and women the chance to be equals in the workplace and in life); Vicki Schultz and Allison
Hoffman, The Need for a Reduced Workweek in the United States, in Precarious Work Women, and the New
Economy: the Challenge to Legal Norms 131 (Judith Fudge and Rosemary Owen, eds., Hart Publg. 2006)
(argues for universal measures that benefit all workers including women); Mary Becker, Caring for Children
and Caretakers, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1495 (2001) (responding to arguments within the care movement).
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However, relational theory need not be complicated by, limited, nor shackled to a
particular conceptual framework. In other words, it need not be defined as an
exclusively feminist, gendered construction. To the contrary, groups shape affinities
across defined categories of shared experiences religion, race, class, sexual orientation,
and across conceptual, synthetic spaces, including organizational commitments, such as
groups and clubs. Relationships are important to groups of people-and not only
women. 151
Indeed, the law grants status to relationships, as in the cases of families and
marriages. In these spheres, courts and judges recognize (legally and symbolically) the
status of "relationships" as nearly on par with that of the individuals comprising the
relationship. Beyond its efforts to respond to the best interest of children, a principle
concern of family law urges the preservation and promotion of the family relationship.
Equally tort law manifests respect for, and concerns about preserving relationships;
family immunity doctrine provides a muscular example of civil law's interest in
relationships and family matters by limiting disgruntled and aggrieved persons' ability to
litigate against family members. Criminal law's effort to privilege and protect
communications between spouses also acknowledges law's respect for and intuition
about relationships forged by marriage.
The weaknesses in relational approaches to legal problems are obvious, as societies
might rightfully be in conflict over what values actually matter most in interpreting
contracts, constitutional law disputes, or family law matters. Thus criticism of the
relational approach cannot be dismissed. A rightful and fruitful critique of relational
theory cautions against essentialism and the pitfalls of communitarianism--or believing
that everyone holds shared views within a given community or society.
However, it is difficult to ignore the saliency of shared life experiences between
groups (relationships) and the strengths and nuances of those bonds to matters of law and
society, including contracts, family law, and potentially other matters where the law
serves to mediate disputes or negotiate resources, including organ supply and demand.
Context matters. In this domain it becomes quite clear that affection, affinity, and bonds
of friendship, loyalty, trust, and cooperation matter most.
IV. RELATIONAL MARKETS AND INTIMATE SPHERES: THE CASE FOR KIDNEYS
This article makes several claims. First, affinity relationships matter and carry
significant power in human biological spheres. Second, markets maximize access to
relation-building. Third, affinity preferencing creates ideal, relational markets. Lastly,
individuals are more inclined to participate in biological exchanges when their
preferences are maximized. In other words, individuals shape their preferences
according to relational norms and utilize the market to further specific types of
relationship building. Research confirms the underlying assumptions of this project:
choice matters, including the option to exercise relational preferences.
Part IV applies the article's intuition to organ supply and demand. It makes the
151. See Mary Becker, Caringfor Children and Caretakers, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1495 (2001); 1 Love You
Man (Dreamworks 2009) (motion picture).
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case that organ supply would likely increase among groups where demand is greatest if
the ability to maximize by relationship were institutionalized. Specifically, the article
hypothesizes that choice without penalty, to designate the recipient (or recipient group)
of organs, would increase supply. This section also acknowledges the potential for push
back against institutionalizing preference maximization along affinity lines. The project
urges a nuanced approach to affinity preference maximization to overcome the negative
social impacts that can result from relational shopping.
A. Why A Relational Approach To Organ Transplantation?
Why a relational approach to organ transplantation? Numerous empirical studies
reveal serious weaknesses in the current, altruistic system of organ procurement.
Researchers describe the U.S. transplant system as one that fails to generate an adequate
supply of organs to satisfy a growing demand. Deaths, delays, and a growing lack of
confidence in the U.S. transplantation system are, they argue, the inevitable outcomes.
The U.S. transplant system is characterized by distress and inefficiencies. Procurement
efforts are tethered to unsuccessful publicity campaigns and slogans to promote organ
donation. These problems are more acute among African Americans, who comprise a
third of the kidney transplant waitlists, wait longer than all other groups, and suffer the
highest death rate among all groups. Thus, resolving organ demand among African
Americans would significantly reduce patient suffering and considerably ease transplant
waitlists.
After twenty-five years, Congress continues to predicate organ transplantation on
prospective donors' blind, altruistic contributions to the organ pool. This experiment
results in significant inefficiencies and externalities with catastrophic consequences. The
sad reality that over 80,000 Americans wait for kidneys unlikely to ever materialize pales
in comparison to more than a quarter million patients on dialysis that would benefit from
an organ transplant. Preemptive rationing, including the utilization of a non-uniform
process in determining who qualifies for an organ transplant, serves to artificially narrow
the list of registered kidney patients. Thus an already skewed demand-supply ratio
happens to be far worse than what the waitlist purports.
The U.S. transplant regime problem relates directly to input. Too few organs come
into the procurement system and thus, supply cannot satisfy demand. Thousands will be
terminated from the U.S. waitlists this year because they became too old or sick.
152
Others will succumb to preventable deaths because organs did not materialize in time.
153
The current federal organ regime is marked by extended delays and high rates of death.
Yet the problem could be resolved quite simply by increasing organ supply.
However, this excessive resistance to value-based donations likely serves as the
most significant impediment to organ procurement by members of Congress. Currently,
Congress bans organ sharing based on valuable consideration. 154 Indeed, the National
Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) imposes criminal penalties and fines on those persons
willing to exchange an organ for remuneration or considerations as innocuous as a cup of
152. See generally Goodwin, Black Markets, supra n. 19.
153. Id.
154. See Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984).
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orange juice or a spa treatment. Some scholars argue that this Congressional approach
spares the poor from being coerced and limits their exposure to greedy patients needing
organs. However, NOTA also prohibits a donor's estate from receiving assistance to
bury the donor or pay her medical bills.
Unpacking the supply-side question illuminates the serious weaknesses in our
legislative approach to organ procurement. Altruism is not enough. Blind
considerations do not inspire organ donation at a rate necessary to make a reasonable
dent in the demand for organs. For these reasons, this article hypothesizes that
sensitivity to relational dynamics might help to overcome the bias against donation.
Specifically, allowing relational transfers for organs will likely reduce organ demand.
B. Affinity Maximization
At the most obvious level, relationships situate individuals within communities,
institutions, and even families. A relational approach may allow us to "predict new ways
of seeing [the] law." 155 Most importantly a relational approach may sensitize us to what
drives certain markets, what will sustain others. Or it may give warning-a clarion call
of sorts-about market failures and externalities that we may wish to avoid.
This article calls attention to a more dynamic view of relational theory, one that
recognizes what motivates exchanges in intimate goods and asks what can be learned
from that. Thus at its core, the project does not make a statement about, nor is it
concerned with gender relations, race relations, or other relationships as between parents
and children per se. Rather, the purpose of the relational model critique or application
here is simply that relationships and affinities matter to some participants conducting
intimate exchanges. It happens that those who most seek (or desire) to acquire certain
intimate goods such as ova and organs, happen to be represented among groups typically
considered marginalized (women and blacks). If this is true, a relational theory approach
can enhance understanding of how markets function, specifically intimate markets.
There are questions for the law in this domain. For example, should the exclusion
of others in relational exchanges be an issue for the law to do anything about? Should
the desire of blacks to share their kidneys primarily among themselves cause pause?
What about the preference shopping of white baby shoppers to primarily adopt only
white children-should the law care about that and if so, why or why not?
Interestingly, discontent over markets does not capture these issues. Backlash
against markets at times flows from the very communities that demand intimate
exchanges of the kinds that are the subjects of this project. Often, the language of
markets is not used as opponents in these contexts prefer to define or mischaracterize
these exchanges as purely altruistic--only with service fees attached. At other times,
resistance to markets is dominated by a type of paternalism that seems difficult to take
seriously, particularly when it assumes that women and minorities lack sophistication
and are incapable of navigating intimate exchanges in the marketplace (i.e. blacks would
handle compensation for organs irresponsibly and therefore should never receive an
incentive for sharing an organ). Ultimately, the critical question to explore is who might
155. Victoria Nourse, Law's Constitution: A Relational Critique, 17 Wis. Women's L. J. 23, 28-29 (2002).
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benefit from and who is likely to be harmed by relational markets? In this context, a
relational market need not be contingent on economic exchanges. Instead, bartering
across affinity status, for purpose of this project, constitutes market participation.
1. Markets
Typical markets have certain features. Market players assume that there are
numerous parties on both sides of the market, believing that there are broad trading
options. In addition, as Richard Epstein points out, there are two additional features of
competitive markets: 1.) full information about the relevant goods, and 2.) that the legal
system supplies perfect enforcement of basic exchange obligations. 156 Missing is an
understanding of what motivates these exchanges, information vacuums, and insider
buying-essentially the use of preference and choice.
In the realm of intimate goods, there are market/exchange constraints, which often
force buyers and sellers into greater stigmatized markets. Consider the criminal trials of
two couples from the United States currently being prosecuted in Egypt. 157 Their plight
reveals two important issues for purposes of this project. The first is the robust demand
for children. That the demand is being satisfied with a financial exchange indicates the
existence of a market. The second important issue to recognize in the Egyptian adoption
cases is the constraints on markets in intimate goods. Buyers will go underground
because of or when legal conflicts exist or stigma is high. Thus markets in intimate
goods tend not to operate like typical markets. And this may be good and bad.
As Epstein points out, "often the ... assumption" that governs markets, is that they
deal in fungible goods. 158 This is very often not the case. The assumption Epstein refers
to is that the goods are of quality, but also of equal aesthetics. This is less true in
markets of intimate goods. For prospective buyers, not all intimate goods are fungible.
Intimate goods are valued differently depending on relationships or perceived
affinities or affection to the goods. Thus, we value intimate goods differently based on
gender, religion, race, class, and other values. This may be a good thing if what the
supplier provides has relatively strong value within the market. It can be perceived as a
bad thing if some exchanges suffer or do not come to fruition because the value of the
good is based on its gender or race and that particular gender or race happens to not be in
demand. This may matter less when the bargained for items are sperm, ova, and
embryos, but it takes on a different meaning when we speak of children.
But Epstein also urges caution with the lexicon of exchanges. To him there is an
imprudent rush to presume that markets are in operation whenever individuals are
engaging in voluntary exchanges as buyers and sellers. 159 In this way a one-time ova
seller is not really a market player-she is the occasional, casual participant. The same
156. Richard Epstein, Keynote Lecture, In Cautious Praise of the Commodification of Genetic Materials
(Chicago Apr. 4, 2008) (available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/lawecon/events/commodities.htmnl).
157. Cynthia Johnston, Egypt Court Jails U.S. Couples Over Illegal Adoptions,
http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSTRE58G2M720090917 (last updated Sept. 17, 2009) (on
September 17, 2009, in a much publicized case, an Egyptian court sentenced two American couples to two
years in prison for allegedly buying babies in Egypt).
158. Epstein, supra n. 156.
159. Id.
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will be true with organ donors-one heart is all you've got to give-and that should
hopefully be at death. The benefit of the market is that there is greater protection for the
single transaction users-on both ends.
It is also worth thinking about the intersection of morale, trust and markets. When
morale and trust are low in intimate exchanges-fewer of them will occur. Harriet
Washington provides a sophisticated treatment of this issue as it relates to African
Americans and medicine. 160 Washington documents a troubling history of medical
abuse and exploitation targeted at African Americans, including nonconsensual medical
experimentation and lack of full disclosure in medical trials. 161 The Tuskegee Syphilis
Study ranks among many that Washington and other scholars document on this point. 1
62
In that study, illiterate African American sharecroppers were unwitting subjects in a
medical experiment to document the ravages of syphilis on their bodies. Thus, while
they believed the pink pills they received from doctors were to treat syphilis, instead the
tablets were placebos. The impact of that medical experiment and others, according to
Washington, continues to undermine trust and loyalty in the medical profession for
African Americans. 163 However, relational markets could help to overcome that internal
group bias against the medical profession.
During the years 2002 through 2004, an empirical survey of 588 African
Americans assessed their perception of the current altruistic donation system for organ
transfer (African American Organ Transplant Study I "AAOTS 1"). 164  The study
evaluated whether the existing differential between American approval of organ donation
and donor registration was due to registration obstacles alone, or rather to a more
general, but overlooked, "breach of confidence and lack of trust in the current
transplantation and procurement systems."' 165 The study was followed by forty in-depth
qualitative interviews (African American Organ Transplant Study II, "AAOTSII").
Combined, the two studies revealed a more subtle race tension that exists when African
American's interact with the current organ procurement and allocation system-
"participants perceived the altruistic process to be manipulative and a veiled effort to
sacrifice African Americans to save White Americans."
' 16 6
Sophisticated study participants, including a banker, physician, nurse, and school
teachers, shared similar doubts and perceptions about the efficiency and fairness of the
U.S. transplant system as their working class counterparts. In sum, they believed that a
bias plagues the transplant allocation system, if not by race, then by socio-economic
status.167 Study participants were generally cynical about whether the UNOS allocation
160. See Washington, supra n. 21.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 157.
163. Id. at 157-85.
164. Goodwin, Black Markets, supra n. 19, at 49-53.
165. Id. at 48.
166. Id. at 49.
167. Interview with D.B. (Nov. 21, 2003). D.B., a school teacher, believed that African Americans were
lower on the transplant waitlists because of their "socio-economic situation." Id. D.B. also thought African
Americans should be paid to donate their organs because of this. Id. He went further to say financial
incentives might be ok if it provided a "means of breaking a horrific cycle which your family may be in as far
as economics are concerned and you wanted your children to have a better chance at life to be on the same
playing field as our white counterparts, I think that it will be a decision that I would make without
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system benefits African Americans. Some of the participant responses verged on mild
hysteria; one participant suggested that "efforts to encourage African Americans to
donate were part of a conspiracy 'because they were going to use Black people as spare
parts ... when White people are sick ... they'll have a means to get their organs.' ,,168
It became clear in the study that blacks perceive a lack of choice and control in the
altruistic process. D.B., a Chicago area school teacher, underscored the point about
relational bonds mattering in organ exchange. He urged blacks to "stay[] together as a
people," implying that African Americans should be able to determine the recipients of
their organs. 169 Allowing for potential donors to control the racial, cultural, religious, or
gender of their recipient may be one way in which an organ transfer system can provide
this type of control. Further data from the AAOTS I and II studies suggest the same:
For example, in AAOTS I when survey participants were asked whether they are registered
to donate, only 36% answered affirmatively. However, when asked whether they would be
willing to donate if the recipients were Black, over 58% answered positively. Thus, the
concept of organ sharing is not the problem; fewer than 10% of those surveyed opposed
donation. Indeed, Blacks were more willing to donate when they believed African170
Americans would be treated equitably in both the procurement and allocation process.
The critical issue for African Americans in organ transplantation may be "control,"
or the perceived lack of it. As one participant concluded after being asked whether
mandatory donations would benefit African Americans, "no, because they are going to
give it to the white person." 171 This participant suggested that even poorer, working
class white Americans would be privileged with receiving organs over their African
American counterparts. 172 Another African American teacher, Y.C., attributed present
organ donation among African American to the desire to save the lives of blacks.
According to Y.C., African Americans participate in organ donation, "because they want
to insure that African Americans get the organs that they need."173
2. Relational Markets, Organs, and a Thought Experiment
At the heart of this project is a desire that the current transplant process become
equitable, efficient, and effective. Despite some progressive efforts, achieving the
"Three Es" has eluded policy makers and UNOS, the organization that governs
transplant policy in the U.S. Achieving the Three Es may not be as complicated as some
might suggest. However, better success in the organ realm might require borrowing
methodology and practice from other domains such as ART, improving upon those
practices, and strict monitoring so that negative social impacts do not come to define
hesitation .
168. Goodwin, Black Markets, supra n. 19, at 50 (footnote omitted).
169. Interview with D.B., supra n. 167.
170. Goouwin, Black Markets, supra n. 19, at 52.
171. Interview with S.B. (Nov. 21, 2003). S.B. was 34 years old at the time that she participated in our
study. She was clear to acknowledge that she would readily surrender a kidney to a relative, but seemed very
mistrustful of organ donation in general because she believed African Americans would more likely be passed
over on the allocation side.
172. Id.
173. Interview with Y.C. (Oct. 27, 2003).
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organ transplantation. Maximizing organ sharing through relational transfers could
maximize saving lives and in the process remove stigma associated with affinity based
sharing. Until now, pushback on affinity related accommodations were in direct
response to the institutionalized subordination of women and blacks. Employment
discrimination or exclusions were practices emanating from a vile racial history, and
certainly were not programs to save the lives of dying individuals. Rather, they were
motivated and carried out by animus.
This project highlights that responding to relational building is inspired less by an
attempt to discriminate, but more by a collective sense to help a member in a group to
acquire a needed resource that would not likely come available (voluntarily) from any
other source. Thus, if religious groups, sororities, or fraternities, or groups of professors
decided to share organs among themselves, this effort would not fall on the repugnant
end of a spectrum. To the contrary, their efforts would appear morally good and the
moral social impact would appear neutral. Here is why.
In 2008, almost 50,000 people added their names to organ waitlists. 174 Waitlist
addition increases an average of 10% per year. 175 Yet, fewer than 16,000 organs became
available for transplant in 2008, an increase of less than four percent from the year
before. 176 The organ supply conundrum cannot be resolved by increased government
spending for advertisement campaigns promoting organ donation, because such efforts
appear to do very little in creating an equilibrium in the demand and supply matrix. 1
7 7
At present, potential organ donors must respond positively to a single binary
question in order to become an organ donor: do you wish to become an organ donor. 178
This question exposes the lack of choice in the transplant system. Either a prospective
organ sharer agrees to that rigid option (in a system mired by efficiency problems and
race disparities) or the potential donor refuses to donate at all.
The constrained option approach cannot fit within a relational framework. Choice
matters, but the mechanics of how it is facilitated is not the primary concern of this
project. An approach as simple as checking a box indicating affinity preference could
suffice. 179 More sophisticated measures could be implemented utilizing technology and
174. See OPTN, Waiting List Additions by Ethnicity, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/rptData.asp
(last updated Nov. 13, 2009) (choose category "waiting list additions" and organ as "all" and count
"candidates" and select "organ by ethnicity.").
175. Id. The percent calculation was performed by dividing the marginal increase in individuals added to
organ waitlists over the total number of yearly additions. The result was then multiplied by 100%.
176. See OPTN, Donors Recovered in the US by Donor Type, http://www.optn.org/latestData/rptData.asp
(last updated Nov. 13, 2009).
177. See generally H.R. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
Assessing Initiatives to Increase Organ Donation, 108th Cong. 36 (June 3, 2003) (see prepared statement of
Richard M. Devos: "[e]ducational campaigns, advertisements, enrollment drives, and all the methods tried up
to now have yielded less than 40% of the population signing, where available, on the back of driver's licenses
or donor cards, and proportionally even less people joining potential donor organizations.").
178. Some states also allow organ donors to specify which organs they are willing to donate. See e.g. Conn.
Dept. of Motor Vehicles, Donor Registration Card, http://www.ct.gov/dmv/lib/dmv/20/29/B-142.pdf (last
accessed Nov. 19, 2009).
179. Instead of a single question, donor registration forms could also ask respondents to select a desired
recipient race, if any, by checking one of several boxes. Alternatively, an individual could simply indicate in
writing the desired race of their organ recipient. Individuals who do not wish to select a racial preference for
their organ recipient could abstain from doing so either by affirmatively checking a box indicating this
preference or by failing to specify a racial preference after indicating their desire to become an organ donor.
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maximizing privacy to avoid stigma associated with checking off relational preferences.
For example, private organizations, such as Matchingdonors.com, 180 provide
living donors the ability to go online and select their organ recipient. Profiles of
individuals awaiting organ transplants include pictures and personal histories. Implicitly,
if not explicitly, selection on the basis of affinity preferences is possible. This venue
allows living donors to foster relationships otherwise not available through anonymous
altruistic donation. And although financial considerations are absent from exchanges
through Matchingdonor.com, donor pairs participate in a process that has life-saving
value. 181 Building affinity through this process only enhances the forming of bonds and
building trust and confidence in the transplant system.
Should the law treat affinity donations based on social group affinities such as
sororities, fraternities, or special clubs versus race differently? Not necessarily.
Allowing for racial preferences during donor registration may save lives, foster a
relational connectivity between donors and recipients, reduce national and state health
care costs, and restore families. These same positive dynamics exist whether the affinity
is based on religion, race, gender, or book club. Thus, an affinity-based policy in organ
transplantation (or blind omission to affinity preferencing) should not be rebuffed simply
over concerns regarding the use of race, gender, or religion as selection criteria.
This project does not attempt to map what or how affinity exceptions might be
built into state and or the federal model. States are theatres of experimentation and can
contour exchanges that fit within a measured rubric. But, here are some initial thoughts.
Affinity grouping incorporates particular aspects of an organ transfer system based on
free market principles. It supplants government decisions with those of "market
participants." To increase HLA matching, individuals could utilize affinity as is
facilitated in reproductive markets where participants exercise preferences for race,
athleticism, IQ, or other characteristics when working with sperm banks or acquiring ova
directly from donors.
Some may argue that the proposed use of racial preferences to incentivize organ
donations will reveal or create nefarious distributional consequences. To this end,
scholars fear that white donors, who comprise the largest percentage of organ donors
currently, 182 will use racial preferences to restrict their donations to only white
individuals. As a result, they caution, greater inequality in organ allocation will occur
among racial groups than is present within the current system. The gravity of such
concerns should not be dismissed entirely, yet should be treated with measured reasoning
and answered with empirical data. Empirically, the argument itself is unpersuasive.
Given no increase in absolute number of organs donated, if 50% of kidneys
procured from blacks are directed to black recipients and only 20% of kidneys donated
180. See MatchingDonors.com, Organ Donors, Organ Transplant, Organ Donor Services,
http://www.matchingdonors.com/life/index.cfn (last accessed Nov. 19, 2009).
181. See id. Patient and Donor profiles and stories available on front-page of website. To the extent that the
donor receives existential benefits, "giving the gift of life" is not an entirely selfless act. Value is exchanged; it
is simply non-pecuniary in nature.
182. 10,190 of the 14,755 donors in 2006 were white. 2,061 of the 14,755 donors were black. However,
blacks represent 28.2% of those individuals awaiting organ donation. Data includes both living and cadaver
donations. See OPTN, Donors Recovered in the US by Donor Type, http://www.optn.org/
latestDatalrptData.asp (last updated Nov. 19, 2009).
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from white donors are directed to white recipients, the allocation ratio of black kidney
recipients to white kidney recipients changes to 0.463. Unsurprisingly, this ratio
increases as the percentage of kidneys directed to black recipients from black donors
increases and the percentage of white within race donation decreases. Thus, even
without increasing the actual number of kidneys distributed, a gain in social equity is
possible by allowing some amount of directed allocation.
If allowing directed affinity donation on the basis of race does, in fact, incentivize
blacks to participate as organ donors, then the picture crystallizes. Assuming that black
participation rates increase to the national average for minority populations18 3 , and
assuming that black within-race directed donation was perfect (100%), then organ
allocation equity would increase even if 95% of white donors directed their organs to
white recipient.
B. Tolerating A Bit of Discrimination?: Law, Economics, and Social Impacts
Affinity grouping in organ exchanges raises policy questions as to how much our
society should tolerate preferences and whether all forms of discrimination are
necessarily bad or illegal. In the context of ART, affinity grouping or matching has a
socially neutral impact. Creating children that look like their parents is not an issue that
deserves serious critique. Scholars are more concerned with sophisticated technologies
such as pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), which allows parents to select
amongst embryos certain characteristics they might desire to prune from the bunch, such
as a particular gender, eye color, or inheritable genetic disease. Some scholars caution
that PGD can be a slippery slope leading to eugenics practices. An attentive eye to PGD
should not be discouraged-on a scale it represents the maximization of choice in the
ART realm and thus would be (on a scale) closer to the point of creating social impacts,
although not completely there.
Preference shopping in adoption raises a different set of concerns than ART and
organs. In the adoption domain, states allow individuals to pass over children who need
homes in order to select for race, gender, and age. One might suggest that this disserves
a broader social and economic agenda to remove children from foster care and
compromised living conditions. The social impacts here relate as much to exacerbating
the stigmatization of children who are left behind and considered unworthy as to the
privileging of an image of children in demand. In this context, children in demand could
be perceived as more socially valued within our society. These issues are addressed in
finer detail in prior works. 
18 4
183. Participation rates are based on the study conducted by the Gallup Organization for the Division of
Transplantation Health Resources and Services Administrations. See OrganDonor.gov, 2005 National Survey
of Organ and Tissue Donation Attitudes and Behaviors, http://www.organdonor.gov/survey2005 (last accessed
Jan. 21, 2010) (reporting that 61% of whites, 31% of blacks, and 52.7% on average grant permission for organ
and tissue donation on their driver's licenses).
184. See Michele Goodwin, The Free-Market Approach to Adoption: The Value of a Baby, 26 B.C. Third
World L. J. 61 (2006).
To the extent that those individual decisions can negatively impact society--economically, morally,
or burden social services, the state arguably has a role in regulation. In the context of adoption,
individuals make choices that can have significant implications for a broader society, about which
society should be concerned.
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Here are some initial thoughts to be fine tuned, further massaged, and recalibrated
over time regarding organs. First, given a choice to direct donation by affinity-or in the
contexts of organs by race, greater equality in organ allocation is possible even without a
corresponding increase in overall donor number. In this project, the proposal is not to
incentivize organ sharing by paying for it, which distinguishes this type of affinity based
preference shopping from that in ART or adoption because no funds change hands. On
scale, this minimizes some of the social pushback that might result from implementing a
plan such as this. Notwithstanding, organ patients are uniquely situated within these
biological frames and it is only in this context where lives are saved, so even recognition
of an affinity based exchange through a tax break or a financial perk falls more neutral
on scale than current ART and adoption practices.
Secondly, the inclusion of racial preferences is likely to stimulate organ donation
to recipients of color. African Americans, who do not donate as frequently as whites,
might be incentivized to donate their organs to black recipients.185 Third, assuming all
other racial groups donate organs at the same rate, an increase in the absolute number of
black organ donors can both increase the absolute number of transplantable organs and
decrease the inequity of the current organ allocation system. Fourth, it is unlikely that
the altruistic white donor who contributes without preference to race currently will make
animus-based racial decisions simply because the opportunity is available. Finally, even
if the use of racial preferences incentivizes certain non-black individuals previously
unwilling to donate to give organs to other non-black patients, the net impact will be
positive for people of color awaiting a transplant.
The most salient objections to affinity transplants converged on the point that
racial harmony might be impacted by donors selecting recipients by affinity. But such
arguments ignore the fact that current efforts at transracial, colorblind organ transplants
do not foster racial harmony. Indeed, organ transplants are not intended to create racial
harmony in our society-such is not their function, goal, or medical objective.
Contemporary transplantation, however, does add to racial anxiety because of the
disparities that persist within the current system.
Might affinity preferencing help blacks overcome disparities within the current
color-blind system? In addition to deaths resulting from unmet organ demand in black
communities, the disparate impact of organ allocation creates economic consequences.
For each African American on dialysis, his or her family suffers the economic
If the byproducts of free adoptions are two-tiered racial systems or racial hierarchies, it is an
issue worth greater social scrutiny. Beyond race, society might also be concerned about middle
class whites (and other groups) being priced out for white babies, which has a double negative
effect. [If] the market responds only to the highest bidder with regard to white babies, it is possible
that white babies will only be placed with wealthier families. The problem created by the free
market [adoption] is the legitimization of a troubling normative view that adoption should only be
among the wealthy and ignoring the class diversity in the United States, which could have a
deterrent effect on "class diverse" adoptions.
Id. at 75-76.
185. African American philanthropic preferences may more closely align with church affiliation rather than
race. See Alice Gresham Bullock, Taxes, Social Policy, and Philanthropy: The Untapped Potential of Middle-
and Low-Income Generosity, 6 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Policy 325, 350 (1997) ("Historically, the Black church
has been the core of philanthropy in the African American community."). This suggests that religious, rather
than racial, preferences are a more appropriate "framing" to incentivize black organ donation.
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consequences of that lost income. The ripple effect of that economic loss extends to
their communities, both through a loss of taxable income for local infrastructure,
including schools, and through a loss of philanthropic donation to community
organizations, including churches, community centers, and fraternal organizations.
These losses are not insignificant as they happen to be critical in sustaining healthy, well-
functioning, safe communities.
African Americans have considerable spending power, and the economic potential
of their community has the power to increase. In 2003, black spending power was
estimated at $656 billion dollars, 186 a figure comparable to the gross domestic product of
the twentieth wealthiest country in the world-the Netherlands. 187  In 2006, black
spending power was estimated at $799 billion dollars, 188 a figure comparable to the GDP
of the eighteenth wealthiest country in the world-Australia. 189 Moreover, the projected
percentage increase in black purchasing power is greater than that of the overall
purchasing power in America. 190  In turn, not only is the economic value of a black
person significant to the American economy as a whole, it is becoming more valuable
each day.
Given that the black population of America is roughly 38.3 million, the GDP per
capita of an African American in 2004 was $17,728.191 Even when completely
discounting costs saved from medical care and dialysis treatments, removing just 1,000
blacks from organ waitlists each year could add $17 million in purchasing power to the
U.S. economy. If 5,000 organs are successfully transplanted, over $80 million in
purchasing power would be added to the U.S. economy. In addition, considering the
federal savings from removing blacks from dialysis, roughly $60-90,000 is saved per
year, per African American patient. 192  Again if only 100 African Americans were
removed from dialysis, $6-9 million dollars is saved in the first year. Over five years,
the savings multiply up to $45 million dollars by simply removing 100 African
Americans from dialysis. Consequently, removal from and successful transplantation of
100 black dialysis patients could result in a net economic gain of $46.7 million.
More importantly, transitioning African American patients off of dialysis allows
them to regain their lives and economic potential. The costs of dialysis extend beyond
financial-they impact daily, family, and community life. Treatments usually require at
186. See Target Market News: The Black Consumer Authority, Consumer Expenditure Data: From "The
Buying Power of Black America, " http://www.targetmarketnews.com/buyingpowerstats.htm (last accessed
Nov. 19, 2009).
187, See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Country Comparison-GDP (Purchasing Power
Parity), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html (last accessed
Nov. 19, 2009).
188. See Vicky Eckenrode, Sway at the Supermarket: Minorities in Florida and Georgia are Spending
RecordAmounts, Fla. Times-Union DI (Sept. 1, 2006).
189. See Central Intelligence Agency, supra n. 182.
190. See Jeffrey M. Humphreys, African-American Buying Power by Place of Residence: 1990-1999, 58 Ga.
Bus. & Econ. Conditions 1, 1-2 (Jul./Aug. 1998).
191. GDP per capita is calculated by dividing the GDP for African Americans by the number of African
Americans in the United States. In 2004, this meant dividing 679 billion by 38.3 million.
192. See e.g. Michael J. Lysaght, Maintenance Dialysis Population Dynamics: Current Trends and Long-
Term Implications, 13 J. Am. Socy. of Nephrology S37, S37 (2002).
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least three days per week and several hours each session. 19 3 Thus, both quality of life
and work potential are significantly diminished.
There is also reason to believe that such numbers are under-estimates.
Transplantation is not only the optimal medical treatment but also the most cost-effective
treatment for patients suffering from kidney failure. The federal government funds both
dialysis treatment and transplantation procedures for almost all Americans. 194 Yet, after
assuming such burdens, the Health Care Financing Administration noted that
transplantation was the most cost-effective means of treating patients with irreversible
kidney failure. 195 Medicare direct dialysis costs routinely exceed $55,000 per patient,
per year. Not surprisingly, congressional efforts to legalize paired kidney donation,
which may spur transplants, are estimated to save $500 million dollars over a 10 year
period. 196
V. CONCLUSION
This project urges a rethinking of transplant policy to specifically allow for ties of
emotion, affection, and more explicitly religion, race, gender, and other groupings to
serve as a "market" to meet organ demand. But here, I've placed the cart before the
horse. There remains the question as to whether there should be any markets in intimate
goods; whether such markets obstruct the law or how we believe the law should be-if
we had thought that far ahead. Richard has observed that the recent cries of
"commodification" do not point to "how market institutions introduced standardization
that makes voluntary exchanges possible," rather, the contemporary parlance, "has
exactly the opposite valence."' 197 Here the contemporary cries are an effort to "explain
why those supposed efforts at standardization and voluntary exchange, especially for
valuable consideration, run against the moral grain." 198  Further, contemporary
observations about markets in intimate goods urge the prohibition of such exchanges,
evoking images of abused and coerced poor people, exploited women, and manipulated
minorities.
However, what is missing from that discourse is that women, poor people, and
minorities might indeed want to participate in intimate markets. That in fact, their
193. See Stella L. Smetanka, Who Will Protect the "Disruptive" Dialysis Patient? 32 Am. J. of L. &
Medicine 53, 54-55 (2006).
194. Congress intended "to provide access to life-saving therapy for all who needed it where the costs of
treatment were beyond the means of practically all individuals." Richard A. Rettig & Ellen L. Marks,
Implementing the End-Stage Renal Disease Program of Medicare: Prepared for the Health Care Financing
Administration, US. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 25 (Rand 1980).
195. See generally Roger W. Evans, Organ Transplantation and the Inevitable Debate as to What
Constitutes a Basic Health Care Benefit, in Clinical Transplants 1993, 359 (J. Michael Cecka & Paul I.
Terasaki eds., UCLA 1994).
196. See Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 108-216, 118 Stat. 584 (2004). See
also Press Release, Congressman Jay Inslee, House Honors Fallen Colleague by Passing Kidney-Donation
Bill: Norwood-Inslee Legislation Offers Hope to Patients on Transplant List (Mar. 7, 2007) (available at
http://www.house.gov/inslee/issues/health/house passes norwoodbill.html) (estimating that such a measure
could save Medicaid at least $220,000 in dialysis costs per patient. Also containing an estimate by "[tihe
Congressional Budget Office ... that legalizing paired kidney donation would save about $30 million over 5
years and $500 million over 10 years"). See also Goodwin, supra n. 2.
197. 197.Epstein, supra n. 156.
198. Id.
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participation is not one-sided, but exists on both sides of the market exchange.
Relationships matter to prospective parents where markets or market based
dynamics can satisfy demand to create families. Adoption and assisted reproductive
technology exemplify markets where families attempt to maximize relational
preferences. Relation building need not take place exclusively within markets, however,
when supply is left to biological lotteries individuals may be less inclined to participate,
such as with organ donation.
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